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Following the War of Spanish Succession (1701-1714), administrative reform in the Indies 
began in earnest with the dynastic shift from Habsburg to Bourbon on the Spanish throne. 
Huancavelica, the only relevant source of mercury in the Spanish Americas, was vital to the 
imperial economy. This thesis measures the economic productivity, working conditions, and 
administrative authority of two famous Bourbon governors, Jerónimo de Sola y Fuente and 
Antonio de Ulloa, in the endeavor to evaluate substantive reforms in a period of massive 
transformation throughout the empire. Reliant on primary documents from both governors, in 
addition to secondary sources, this thesis argues that the governors confronted similar challenges 
in reforming a colonial mining town that never surpassed 10,000 citizens. These difficulties 
included supplying sufficient credit to miners, the colonial understanding of the social and 
economic role of indigenous laborers, and combating entrenched bureaucratic systems that 
incentivized corruption and embezzlement. These findings argue for further research into how 
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Discussion of Translations 
All translations of the Relaciónes are my own, and the original Spanish is always included in the 
footnotes for verification. I endeavor to keep the semantic structure as similar as possible, as well 
as the tone; as I am not a native Spanish speaker, the original text is present for the reader’s use. 
 
Glossary of Terms 
Alquila — free wage worker 
Altiplano— high plain or the Andean Plateau 
Asiento— contract 




Azogue— quicksilver or mercury 
Caja real— royal treasury 
Estribos— pillar of support, which contain rich ores but are structurally vital 
Entero en plata— cash payment to commute a mitayo’s service 
Gremio— the miner’s guild 
Ichu— native grass that helps fuel the smelting process 
Invernada— January to April, the season during which miners cannot process ore, because the 
ichu is too damp 
 
La Leyenda Negra— The Black Legend or historical tradition of unique Spanish cruelty in the 
Americas 
 
Magistral— A mixture of copper and iron and essential material in the amalgamation process 
Minga— free wage laborer, also called alquila 
Mita— compulsory indigenous labor system, nominally rotational and once every seven years 
Mitayo— name for the mita workers 




Peso de ocho—  pesos of eight, Spanish silver coin, often debased and poorly minted, equivalent 
to eight reales 
 
Quintal— unit of measurement, 46 kg or roughly 100 lbs. 
Quinto Real— Royal fifth, the Crown’s tax levied on all precious metals 
Real Caja: Any branch of the royal Treasury, for example in Lima. 
Real Cédula— royal order or decree 
Reales— smaller denomination of Spanish currency (pesos de ocho are equivales to eight reales) 
Socavón— In a mine, an adit for drainage or a horizontal tunnel for access 
Umpé— Carbon monoxide that is trapped inside a mine. 
Veedores— inspector of the mine. Two existed underneath Sola and Ulloa 
War of Spanish Succession — 1701-1714, as a result of the childless Spanish king Carlos II’s 
will declaring French King Louis XIV's grandson Philip, duc d'Anjou, his grandnephew, would 





The horrible tempest of persecutions turned my life into a purgatory of continuous 
disappointments.1 
Chapter One: The Empire’s Administrators 
Introduction 
Unruly and overstretched, the Spanish Empire was perhaps never truly consolidated, let 
alone controlled.2 Yet, Spanish Latin America was, and is, infamous. Both colonial riches and 
cruelty rank still as a uniquely Spanish legacy, captivating readers on a global scale. Modern 
scholars have turned away from easy frameworks of conquest, colonialism, and revolution in 
studies of the Spanish Americas. Yet, grandiose topics such as these have a place in the 
macrohistory of colonial Latin America. Extraordinary themes are not necessarily the natural 
enemies of academic research, but rather uniquely human interests that allow readers to 
understand the past as equally captivating as modernity. Simultaneously, “microhistory”, which 
focuses intently on individual actors or events, is also useful, to understand how individuals 
navigated their unique, and, at times, dramatic circumstances. Microhistory, reaching its apex in 
the postmodern wave of the 1970s and 1980s, insists on the interconnectedness of events and 
actors, and is distinguished by “its professed ignorance” and “half-baffled engagement with story 
 
1 "La horrible tempestad de persecuciones constituyéndose mi vida en un purgatorio de continuos desabrimientos." 
Ulloa called Huancavelica a purgatory in letters sent both to Julián Arriaga, minister of the Indies, and King Carlos 
III. citing letters from Ulloa to Julián Arriaga, and to the King, Gobierno, Lima, leg. 777 AGI 
Alfonso W. Quiroz, Corrupt Circles : A History of Unbound Graft in Peru. Book. (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow 
Wilson Center Press , 2008), 43. 
Arthur P Whitaker, "Antonio De Ulloa." The Hispanic American Historical Review 15, no. 2 (1935): 155-94. 
Accessed January 20, 2020. doi:10.2307/2506293, 21. 
2Arthur Whitaker refers to Spain as “a third rate sea-power” by the eighteenth century. D.A. Brading likewise asserts 
that Frederick the Great of Prussia asserted Spain was a “European power of the second rank.” (397). Regardless, of 
exact position Spain was not first. 
Arthur P Whitaker, "Antonio De Ulloa." The Hispanic American Historical Review 15, no. 2 (1935): 155-94. 
Accessed January 20, 2020. doi:10.2307/2506293, 21. 
D.A. Brading, “Bourbon Spain and Its American Empire.” Chapter. In The Cambridge History of Latin America, 
edited by Leslie Bethell, 1:389-440. The Cambridge History of Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University 




as device and historical fact.”3 Far from professing authority as social scientists measuring 
empirical truths, microhistorians raise narrative, human agency, and inherent doubt as the 
foundation of research, considerations equally rigorous to those who practice4 history through 
analyzing regressions, DNA material or data mining. 
In an attempt to better understand Spanish colonial administration in one crucial corner of 
Spain’s oversees empire, Peru, and how it operated, a comparative study in the tradition of 
microhistory is appropriate. Within the spectrum of governance, measuring individuals offers 
greater specificity, and an opportunity for greater depth. A comparative study identifies 
commonalities and larger themes, and some insight in understanding other historians’ evaluation 
relative to individuals’ actions within their larger historical context. In analyzing individual 
actors, many substantive goals can be addressed to understand the specific circumstances, and 
relating that context to reoccurring themes in the historiography.  
Measuring efficacy and reform in Spanish colonial administration is a difficult task. 
However, comparing the administrations of two reformists in one of the most important regions 
of Spanish Latin America, provides insight in imperial attempts to restructure colonial rule. After 
the death of the last Habsburg Spanish king in 1700, the Crown undertook a series of policy 
shifts aimed at centralizing and reorganizing the Americas. The Bourbon Reforms, as they came 
to be known, were an attempt at Enlightened absolutism, in reconquering the strained and far off 
Spanish territory across the Atlantic. If efficacy and reform are slippery and contentious terms, 
perhaps looking at a period of massive administrative transformation, and the transforming 
actors, offers as close to an answer as one can get to an impossible question: How did Spanish 
 
3Thomas V Cohen, “The Macrohistory of Microhistory.” Abstract. Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies 
47, no. 1 (January 1, 2017): 53–73. https://doi.org/10.1215/10829636-3716578. 




rule function, and malfunction? Looking to a small town of perhaps 5,000 people5 is a surprising 
place for an answer. 
Huancavelica, the only prominent mercury mine in Spanish Americas, is an excellent 
place to start. Two of Huancavelica’s most prominent governors, albeit one considerably more 
famous, show the major efforts undertaken to transform colonial administration after the dynastic 
shift from Habsburg to Bourbon, at the close of the War of Spanish Succession. One governor, 
Jerónimo de Sola y Fuente, remains understudied, yet consistently labeled a successful 
administrator. The other, Antonio de Ulloa, is the most famous figure in all of Huancavelica, and 
notoriously condemned as a failure. Ultimately, the two administrations are more similar than 
not. The tenures of Jerónimo de Sola and Antonio de Ulloa show the importance of available 
credit, labor, and diplomacy, in attempting Enlightened reform of a mining town with deep-
seeded interests, situated some 6,000 miles away from Madrid. 
Research Question 
Thus I arrive at my research question: In comparing the two “reforming” governorships 
of Jerónimo de Sola and Antonio de Ulloa, how did colonial administration at Huancavelica 
function? To structure this thesis, I analyze economic administration, the labor system and 
working conditions, and political relationships, under both governors. I reach a conclusion that 
both governors had similar needs and obstacles in their efforts towards effective administration: 
resources and legitimate authority from Spain, complicated relationships to indigenous 
population and the reality of acceptable social and working conditions in the eighteenth century, 
and delicate political ties both to Lima and the local mercury guild. While Antonio de Ulloa 
might be more famously a “failure”, both governors had much in common, and faced similar 
 
5Adrian J. Pearce, “Huancavelica 1563–1824: History and Historiography.” Colonial Latin American Review 22, no. 




difficulties— an overstretched empire tasked with zealous goals of reform. To condemn one a 
failure and the other a success is ultimately a matter of perspective. 
To structure this chapter, I offer brief biographies of both governors as well as a summary 
of relevant historical research. Because of the more numerous studies on Antonio de Ulloa, I 
divide his literature review into three sections, based on the different notable periods of his life. I 
end with a note on the methods and scope of my study. 
In the Literature: Huancavelica 
In Huancavelican studies, Guillermo Lohmann Villena is the defining, exhaustive source 
of the Habsburg administration from the sixteenth and seventeenth century. Arthur Whitaker, for 
most of the twentieth century, would be the parallel authority on the Bourbon dynasty, beginning 
with Philip V’s ascension in 1700, which sparked the War of Spanish Succession (1701-1714). 
Kendall Brown is also notable for his contemporary contributions to the previously overlooked 
Bourbon era in Huancavelica. For many years, Huancavelica was poorly researched in 
comparison to the much more popular Potosí, the famous silver mine in modern-day Bolivia, 
until a recent boom in studies, starting in the last few decades.  
A Short Account of Sola’s Life 
Little research has been done on Jerónimo de Sola y Fuente. I could find nothing in the 
literature detailing Sola’s life outside Huancavelica, other than a brief entry on the website for 
the Real Academia de la Historia, a Spanish institution created by a Real Cedúla by Philip V of 
Spain in 18 April 17386, written by Javier Barrientos, which appears to be an encyclopedia entry. 
Arthur Whitaker, Kendall Brown, Adrian Pearce, and Isabel María Povea Moreno all mention 
 
6Javier Barrientos Grandon wrote the entry, but I found no other works focused on Jerónimo de Sola outside of 
Huancavelica.  





Sola’s life outside of Huancavelica only in passing, mostly noting his appointment on the 
Consejo de los Indias7, the premier legislative and advisory body in the Spanish Americas. 
However, historians do know some circumstances surrounding his appointment as governor to 
Huancavelica. In 1734, Jose Cornejo y Ibarra, a former governor of the Spanish mercury mine, 
Almadén, visited Huancavelica. He wrote a report, with a variety of transformative policy 
recommendations, including eliminating the mining guild in favor of direct exploitation of the 
mine by the Crown, and making the governorship of Huancavelica entirely independent from the 
viceregal administration in Lima. Jerónimo de Sola also toured the mines of Almadén prior to his 
appointment, and was the governor immediately following Cornejo y Ibarra’s report. Likely, the 
Crown charged Sola with implementing these new recommendations, and reforming 
Huancavelica’s mercury to be more similar to Almadén. Sola would probably be best 
characterized as Spanish elite, who worked closely to official Royal bodies his whole life. He 
appeared to have no prior connections to Huancavelica, or the Viceroyalty of Lima more 
generally, prior to his appointment as governor. 
Adrian Pearce is Sola’s preeminent scholar. Pearce is notable both for his research in the 
book The Origins of Bourbon Reform in Spanish South America, 1700-1763, as well as his 
article “Huancavelica 1700-1759: Administrative Reform of the Mercury Industry in Early 
Bourbon Peru.” Pearce notes that Sola had a unique amount of power, compared to other 
governors of Huancavelica, due to a shift in Spanish policy during the early Bourbon period. 
Pearce also makes a strong case for the importance of credit, as well as Sola’s ability to 
acquiesce to other actors in Huancavelica, as the source of his successful tenure. Prior to Pearce, 
Arthur Whitaker was one of the few scholars writing about Sola. Whitaker might be the first 
 
7 Isabel M Povea Moreno, Retrato de una decadencia. Régimen laboral y sistema de explotación en Huancavelica, 




scholar to refer to Sola as “El Restaurador de La Mina”8, or the restorer of the mine, an anecdote 
that other historians habitually include in any work mentioning Sola. Kendall Brown in his essay 
for Saberes Andinos9 focuses on Sola’s technological innovations. Brown cites Sola's writings as 
well in the context of his working conditions, as evidence of the improving health outcomes 
compared to the more deadly conditions of the sixteenth and seventeenth century, when 
Huancavelica was a “public slaughterhouse.”10 In summation, Sola is universally characterized 
as a successful governor, technological innovator, and adept administrator; many sources focus 
on the same specific attributes: Sola’s claim of discovering a famously long lost vein of mercury, 
adding a new technique of blasting to the mine, and his tenure marking the first of more 
administrative power vested in Huancavelican governors. Jerónimo de Sola is thus described as a 
resounding success. 
A Short Account of Ulloa’s Life 
Antonio de Ulloa, in contrast, is somewhat of a superstar in the historiography. Half a 
dozen articles have been written solely about his time in Huancavelica, in addition to a full book 
on the subject.11 Yet, historians focus even more attention on other periods of his life, perhaps 
with some reason. Ulloa lived a sensational life. In 1737, he fought with the president of the 
audiencia in Quito, Joseph de Araujo y Río, because Ulloa was referred to as usted instead of the 
 
8In Whitaker’s work, other contemporaneous miners apparently called Sola “El Restaurador de la Mina”, although it 
remains unclear which miners.  
9Marcos Cueto, “Saberes Andinos : Ciencia y Tecnología En Bolivia, Ecuador y Perú.” Book. Lima : Instituto de 
Estudios Peruanos, 1995. 
10Kendall W. Brown, A History of Mining in Latin America : From the Colonial Era to the Present. Diálogos Series. 
Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 173. 
11Miguel Molina Martínez, Antonio de Ulloa En Huancavelica. (Granada: Universidad de Granada, 1995). 
Adrian J. Pearce, “Huancavelica 1563–1824: History and Historiography.” Colonial Latin American Review 22, no. 







more honorific title usía; Ulloa was once captured by English pirates, and during his 
imprisonment was named a fellow of the Royal Society; as the first Spanish governor in 
Louisiana, he and his pregnant wife jumped on a boat to escape an uprising of angry French 
colonists; and he may have discovered platinum. It is no wonder historians are fascinated by his 
bizarre and adventurous life. 
 Born in Seville in 1716, Antonio de Ulloa y de la Torre-Giral was a famous scientist, 
naval officer, and author. His father was Bernardo de Ulloa, an esteemed economist, and in 1733 
his son enrolled in the elite Naval Academy in Cadiz. In a 1735 mission sanctioned by Louis XV 
of France, Ulloa sailed to South America to measure the meridian arc, to settle ongoing scientific 
debate regarding the shape of the Earth.12 Along with fellow Spanish naval officer, Jorge Juan y 
Santacilia, the French astronomers Charles Marie de la Condamine, Pierre Bouger, Louis Godin, 
the botanist Joseph de Jussieu, and Louis’s relative, Jean Godin, he was a member of the first 
international scientific expedition. Ulloa was 19 years old at the time. His subsequent reports, the 
five volume published Relación histórica del viaje á la América Meridional describing a social 
and environmental survey of South America, and the secret report Noticias Secretas (originally 
titled Discurso y Reflexiones Políticos sobre el Estado presente de los Reynos del Perú) on 
Spanish colonial abuses in Peru, were widely read. In 1744, he set sail on the aptly titled Notre 
Dame de Bonne Déliverance for Spain, when the fleet of ships was attacked by English 
privateers. Bonne Déliverance escaped to the normally friendly Acadia,13 in modern day Nova 
Scotia, whose French flags were still flying. Unbeknownst to Ulloa, Acadia was already 
 
12 For a detailed account of the journey, see Ferreiro, Larrie D Ferreiro, Measure of the Earth: The Enlightenment 
Expedition That Reshaped Our World. (New York: Basic Books, 2011). 





occupied by the Brits. He was imprisoned, but “generously treated”14, shipped swiftly to London, 
where he became a fellow of the Royal Society. Ulloa even had his notes on the expedition were 
returned to him. In July 1746, eleven years since he set out for South America, he returned safely 
to Spain.  
In 1752, Ulloa was sent to France, the Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden to strengthen 
Spanish economic ties and military defenses. Then, in 1757, he was appointed governor of 
Huancavelica, on the recommendation of both Jorge Juan and Julián de Arriaga, minister of the 
Consejo de Indias. Ulloa sailed in 1758 for Peru. In 1764, at Ulloa’s own request, he was 
requited. Nearly immediately after his governorship in Huancavelica, in 1765, he was appointed 
to be the first Spanish governor of Louisiana, then La Florida Occidental. After the Seven Years 
War, France ceded all territory west of the Mississippi River to Spain. Only a few years into his 
post, Ulloa was ousted by a Creole uprising of French colonists in the Louisiana Rebellion of 
1768. Ulloa returned to Spain, and became lieutenant general of the naval forces. He died in 
1795 in Cádiz.  
In the Literature: Noticias, Huancavelica, Louisiana 
In the historiography of Antonio de Ulloa, scholars fix much of their attention squarely 
on the Noticias Secretas as a primary document of Spanish colonial abuses. In contrast, Ulloa’s 
governorship in Huancavelica, despite its economic importance as the only significant source of 
mercury in Spanish America, has not received as much interest. By historians, Ulloa is 
simultaneously exalted as an Enlightened intellectual, and condemned as hopelessly ineffective. 
A cult of personality surrounds Antonio de Ulloa, in which he appears as a hero struggling 
against a current of corruption, or, in contrast, a stubborn, politically incompetent idealist. In the 
 
14Arthur P. Whitaker, "Antonio De Ulloa." The Hispanic American Historical Review 15, no. 2 (1935): 155-94. 




literature, there is a need for a contextualizing force that focuses squarely on Huancavelica and 
Ulloa’s tenure levelled against other governorships. As so much has been written on Ulloa, I 
have divided the relevant research into three relevant periods: the debate surrounding Noticias 
Secretas, his governorship in Huancavelica, and his governorship in Louisiana. While this paper 
will analyze only his post in Huancavelica, the literature surrounding his reputability and 
administrative ability nevertheless are relevant analyses, in order to understand how scholarship 
about Huancavelica under Ulloa has been shaped in relation to scholarship on Ulloa more 
generally. On the whole, Ulloa has been characterized as an Enlightened David, continuously 
fighting a Corrupt Goliath. Unlike David, however, Ulloa supposedly lost. 
Antonio de Ulloa’s Reputability and the Noticias Secretas 
In 1749, Antonio de Ulloa’s secret report following the Geodesic Mission, later dubbed 
Noticias secretas de América, was a harrowing condemnation of abuses and corruption by 
Spanish authorities. The Noticias was a confidential report written for King Ferdinand VI and his 
advisers, urging for reforms. In 1826, David Berry published the Noticias in London, making 
public a previously confidential report on Spanish excesses and abuses. 
Noticias Secretas sparked a historiographical debate about Ulloa and his reputability, one 
that lasted well into the twentieth century, and intertwined with the overarching debates 
surrounding the La Leyenda Negra (the Black legend). La Leyenda Negra was the pervasive idea 
of Spanish cruelty, bigotry and backwardness in its administration of the New World, especially 
regarding the exploitation and subjugation of indigenous people. The Noticias in its 
condemnation of Spanish administration is thus firmly situated in a debate surrounding the 
legacy of Spanish colonialism— was Spanish rule uniquely evil or was this representation 




Lesley Byrd Simpson famously dismissed Noticias Secretas as being “written by two 
boys at a time when it was fashionable to write snappy stuff about Spanish blundering in 
America."15 Noticias was an entrevista in this depiction, entertainment for cosmopolitan 
Europeans titillated by the trope of Spanish villainy. Father Luis Merino, an Augustine priest and 
scholar, likewise ascertained that Ulloa was primarily a secondhand witness to any abuses, and 
thus the Noticias was an unreliable source of information. Merino based his argument on the 
locations of Ulloa’s field work, found in his Relación histórica del viaje á la América 
Meridional. Merino concluded, based on the various time-consuming conflicts Ulloa was 
involved in, and the amount of terrain he realistically covered while on his expedition16, that 
Noticias used mostly second-hand evidence. However, learning information through others’ 
accounts does not necessarily make a source unreliable. Rafael Altamira also doubted the 
Noticias’s honesty. Altamira instead propagated what came to be called the White Legend, a 
direct counter to La Leyenda Negra, in which Spain was an evangelizing and benevolent 
presence in the New World. Altamira’s work, in his view, rectified the supposedly romantic 
illusion of absolute equality among races, and referred to colonialism as social tutelage from a 
superior culture to an inferior.17 Historians in Altamira’s tradition would justify the mita, the 
compulsory labor forced on indigenous peoples, as a benevolent and healthy tradition.18 Scholars 
such as these have clear racial and nativist bias, and their work is dated, emblematic of a 
nineteenth-century vision of some sense of revived Spanish patriotism. Yet, critics of Antonio de 
Ulloa continued past the White Legend era. Luis Merino wrote in the middle of the twentieth 
 
15 Lesley Byrd Simpson. 1993. “Review of Indian labor in the Spanish colonies by Ruth Kern Barber.” Hispanic 
American Historical Review 13 (1933); 363. 
16 Luis Merino, L. (1956). “The Relation between the Noticias Secretas and the Viaje a la America Meridional.” The 
Americas, 13(2), 111–125. https://doi.org/10.2307/979634  
17Rafael Altamira, Psicología del pueblo español. Barcelona, Editorial Minerva, 1900. 
http://archive.org/details/psicologadelpu00altauoft. 




century, as did Lesley Simpson.19 They were both contemporaries with Arthur Whitaker, still 
considered the defining source on Antonio de Ulloa’s life.20 Thus, the Noticias debate persisted 
in some way, entangled with the larger idea of La Leyenda Negra. In a histography with about a 
dozen articles and a few monoliths, this debate around Ulloa’s reputability warrants attention. Is 
Antonio de Ulloa trustworthy, or a propagandist?  
In direct opposition to Altamira, Simpson, and Merino, Arthur Whitaker staunchly 
believed the Noticias was a reputable source. Addressing Merino directly, Whitaker dismissed 
the argument against Noticias’s verifiability by noting Father Merino’s choice to focus nearly 
exclusively on Ulloa’s section on religious orders.21 While David Berry’s publication might have 
had nefarious intent, Ulloa wrote the report confidentiality, hardly an effective strategy to 
sabotage Spain’s reputation. Whitaker convincingly argued that the Noticias’s confidentiality is a 
testament to its validity. How could the Noticias be a source of defamation if it was meant only 
to be read by royal officials? Frederick Alexander Kirkpatrick likewise noted that Antonio de 
Ulloa was not a boy by the time the Noticias was written, like Simpson criticized, but rather a 
seasoned naval veteran and over thirty years old. Noticias also included the banalities only 
relevant to government officials, not purely sensationalist content.22 The prologue to the Noticias 
 
19Simpson wrote his review in 1933, however, this is decades after both Altamira and Carracido. The Black Legend 
was, at this point, taking shape as both a somewhat accurate account of the horrible injustices of colonialism, and 
simultaneously exaggerated in relation to the very comparable abuses by other European imperial forces. 
20Arthur P. Whitaker, "Antonio De Ulloa." The Hispanic American Historical Review 15, no. 2 (1935): 155-94. 
Accessed January 20, 2020. doi:10.2307/2506293. 
Arthur P. Whitaker, The Huancavelica Mercury Mine: a Contribution to the History of the Bourbon Renaissance in 
the Spanish Empire, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1941), 17.  
Arthur P. Whitaker, "Antonio De Ulloa, the Delivrance, and the Royal Society." The Hispanic American Historical  
Review 46, no. 4 (1966): 357-70. Accessed February 15, 2020. doi:10.2307/2510978. 
21 Arthur P Whitaker, “Review of Estudio crítico sobre las “Noticias secretas de América” y el clero colonial. (1720-
1765), by Luis Merino.” The Hispanic American Historical Review 39, no. 2 (1959): 265–67. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/2509873. 




even emphasized the focus would be solely on the abuses of the Spanish empire in Peru, rather 
than the effective aspects of Spanish rule.  
In Lewis Hanke’s representation, Dos Palabras on Antonio de Ulloa and the Noticias 
Secretas, he compared Ulloa to the famous Bartolomé de las Casas.23 In the 1750s, Casas’s 
sixteenth-century account of Spanish abuses, Brevísima relación de la destrucción de las Indias, 
was reissued in several new editions in France and especially in Britain, its popularity in part an 
effort to undercut Spain’s reputation.24 Despite its use to discredit Spain, and some points of 
exaggeration, most scholars agree to Brevísima’s fundamental accuracy.25 Similarly, Hanke 
argued Noticias was reputable, even when used in part as propaganda against Spain; the way 
Noticias was later used does not affect its integral legitimacy.  
Fundamentally, the debate surrounding Noticias echoes the debate of Ulloa as a figure. 
Was he honest? Was he a reformer? Did he exaggerate? Most agree the Noticias was based in 
truth.26 Yet, more interesting perhaps is Kenneth Andrien, who claims not to care whether the 
Noticia was unbiased by the Black Legend’s sentiment. That question seemed unimportant to 
him. Rather, he is interested in its revealing elements on what Spanish ruling ideology was to 
become in the new era. This view seems most compelling.27 Despite overall analysis finding 
Noticias to be mostly substantiated, it seems more important to look beyond black or white ideas 
of truth, heroism, or villainy, but rather at the middling picture and what Ulloa’s experience has 
 
23 Lewis Hanke, “Dos Palabras on Antonio de Ulloa and the Noticias Secretas.” The Hispanic American Historical 
Review 16, no. 4 (1936): 479–514. https://doi.org/10.2307/2506989. 
24Ibid. 
25Benjamin Keen, “The Black Legend Revisited: Assumptions and Realities.” The Hispanic American Historical 
Review 49, no. 4 (1969): 703–19. https://doi.org/10.2307/2511162. 
26Hanke, Kirkpatrick, Quiroz, TePaske, Whitaker all evaluated Noticias as an ultimately reputable account. 
27Kenneth J Andrien, “The Noticias Secretas de America and the Construction of a Governing Ideology for the 






to say about Spanish rule. What if Ulloa was not a hero, nor inept, but rather someone who was 
acting with the resources available at the time, in a manner reflective of new wave of imperial 
ideology?  
Antonio de Ulloa in Huancavelica: Efficacy and Frustration 
The literature surrounding Ulloa’s time in Huancavelica repeatedly refers to the period as 
understudied, in comparison to the Noticias. Pearce, in his 2013 effort to consolidate the existing 
research on Huancavelica, notes that Ulloa as a figure has received unduly extensive attention. 
While true Ulloa receives more attention than other governors, I would still contend he is not 
exhaustively studied. However, the interest is disproportionate compared to other governors. 
Similarly, Ulloa as a character has been fascinating to those eager to cast him a hero or an idiot, 
but analyses situating Ulloa in his resources and as part of a larger reforming movement seem 
limited. This gap is lessened somewhat by my research.  
Whitaker remains perhaps the most important scholar on Ulloa. Whitaker published The 
Huancavelica Mercury Mine; a contribution to the history of the Bourbon renaissance in the 
Spanish empire in 1941, devoting a whole chapter to Ulloa. Whitaker characterizes Ulloa’s time 
as governor in Huancavelica as plagued with issues, especially between Ulloa and the gremio, or 
the powerful miner’s guild. Whitaker focuses extensively on legal battles between the corrupt 
veedores, Joseph de Campusano and Juan de Afino, and Antonio de Ulloa. Whitaker also notes 
Ulloa’s quasi-legal creation of the Minería del Rey, which attempted to consolidate the guild into 
one corporate function, supervised by Ulloa, designed to curtail the corruption of individual 
miners. Whitaker offered a persuasive and nuanced account of Ulloa as overwhelmed by the 
severity and pervasive corruption in Huancavelica. However, Ulloa’s accomplishments remain 




Campusano and Afino, and increased production of the mine, and reduced the mine’s debt. 
These facts seem modestly hidden in comparison to a wave of corruption, and Ulloa’s 
impassioned desire to leave the “purgatory” of Huancavelica.28 Whitaker writes briefly about the 
mita issue, noting the mine had changed from a death-sentence for indigenous laborers to being 
relatively safe. Whitaker justified that because Ulloa wrote Noticias, which condemned Spanish 
abuses against indigenous peoples, he is a trustworthy source; thus, if he says the indigenous 
population were not abused, they were probably not abused.  
Molina Martínez’s might be the only full book dedicated solely to Ulloa’s tenure in 
Huancavelica. Molina Martínez’s thesis is that to be an effective reformer, merely being just, 
honest, and Enlightened is not enough.29 Ulloa was a fallen hero, unable to fight against a 
tangled web of corruption. Kendall Brown, in contrast, seems more inclined to blame Ulloa’s 
personality and political experience: his “reformist zeal, rigid morality, and political 
inexperience” cast him as a hopeless idealist and ultimately ineffective.30 Brown argues that 
despite a historiographical tradition of blaming corruption by greedy Creoles (American-born 
Spaniards), most of Ulloa’s antagonists were peninsulares; Francisco Ocharán, the abusive 
merchant, Diego de Holgado, the attorney for the two corrupt veedores Campusano and Afino 
(who were Creole), and the viceroy Amat. Thus, Brown concludes, Bourbon absolutism was 
mythical. Spain was unable to regain control of its colonies, and Ulloa’s attempts placed him at 
odds with most everyone.31 Corruption was inherently embroiled in the political system, in 
Brown’s rendering. Alfonso Quiroz examines the entire history of corruption in Peru, and hints 
 
28Arthur P Whitaker "Antonio De Ulloa." The Hispanic American Historical Review 15, no. 2 (1935): 155-94. 
Accessed January 20, 2020. doi:10.2307/2506293, 178. 
29Miguel Molina Martínez, Antonio de Ulloa En Huancavelica. (Granada: Universidad de Granada, 1995). 
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at the cyclical nature of colonial corruption. In the colonial era, Quiroz blames the longstanding 
connection between powerful positions and vested interests in contraband and the mineral 
industry. Somewhat paradoxically, Quiroz examines the entrenched nature of embezzlement, but 
disparages scholars who see corruption as a necessary evil of conducting colonial administration, 
seeing them as apologists. In Quiroz’s account, too, Ulloa is somewhat doomed; the roots of 
graft were unconquerable.32 
Pearce notes the early Bourbon Reforms as remarkably effective, in comparison to 
Ulloa’s governorship.33 Jeronimo de Sola won both the cooperation of the Huancavelica gremio 
(the miners’ guild) and the viceregal administration; Molina Martínez and Whitaker likewise 
confirm Sola’s success. Likewise, Pearce notes the unusual stability of 1723-1753, where the 
Spanish crown could guarantee regular credit to miners, allowing sufficient capital and efficient 
distribution necessary for a profitable mine. The importance of credit seems understated by other 
historians in comparison to Pearce’s particular focus on the steady flow of ample funds to 
Huancavelica’s miners. María del Carmen Navarro Abrines’s study compares Ulloa to his 
interim successor, Carlos de Beranger. Ulloa is similarly cast as unable to fight against the 
gremio’s deeply engrained system of corruption, but she likewise notes that he “did not have the 
necessary support from the metropolis at the most critical moments of his government action.”34 
Carlos de Beranger, in Abrines’s view, was better able to compromise with the guild, and was 
not constantly in conflict like Ulloa. However, Beranger was an interim governor appointed by 
 
32Alfonso W. Quiroz, Corrupt Circles : A History of Unbound Graft in Peru. Book. (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow 
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33Adrian J. Pearce, “Huancavelica 1700-1759: Administrative Reform of the Mercury Industry in Early Bourbon 
Peru.” The Hispanic American Historical Review 79, no. 4 (1999). 
34“Ahora bien, también es cierto que el gobernador no contó con el respaldo necesario por parte de la metrópoli en 
los momentos más críticos de su acción de gobierno” 
María del Carmen Navarro Abrienes, “La Mina De Mercurio De Huancavelica (Peru): Entre Los Intentos De 
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the viceroy Amat, rather than by the Crown. It makes some logical sense that Beranger would 
have a better relationship with the guild, if their interests were tied up in Lima, even if Beranger 
himself was a peninsular and not a creole. Beranger was also depicted as more acquiescent to the 
interests of the guild.35 . If Beranger were more intent on ending deep-seeded corruption in 
Huancavelica, perhaps his tenure would have been less peaceful. Abrines’ study furthers a 
dialogue about available resources, the influence of Lima in Huancavelica, and the choices 
individual governors make 
Antonio de Ulloa in Louisiana: Political Ineptitude 
Frances Kolb found Ulloa’s governorship in Louisiana as essentially politically 
incompetent. The ambiguity of his authority caused unnecessary conflict in her eyes. He refused 
to raise the Spanish flag, and sign documents that would transfer ownership of Louisiana from 
France to Spain. Yet, within her work seems to be the answer to why Ulloa would do so.36 He 
was the first Spanish governor, and had merely 90 soldiers. He repeatedly wrote to Spain for 
reinforcements, which he never received, a fact Whitaker corroborated.37  
 Kolb notes that Louisiana was meant as a buffer territory against neighboring British, 
and not a profitable colony nor the focus of Spanish attention. Nevertheless, Kolb notes that 
Ulloa loyally followed Spanish instructions, relocating the Acadians and forcing a trade policy 
that squelched contraband trade. Like Quiroz’s depiction of corruption in Peru, smuggling was a 
way of life in Louisiana, and the local population reacted poorly. In Kolb’s portrayal, Ulloa was 
 
35 Ibid. “Posiblemente, en el caso de Beranger, su éxito se debiera a su política de concesiones y ayudas al gremio o 
a su mayor habilidad conducente a restablecer la tranquilidad y acabar con las fuertes tensiones que se habían 
producido en el gobierno anterior. Sin embargo, no atajó el mal endémico de la corrupción ni logró, por falta de 
tiempo y medios, modernizar la explotación minera.” 
36Frances Kolb, “The New Orleans Revolt of 1768: Uniting against Real and Perceived Threats of Empire.” 
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simultaneously too stern, unilaterally applying a trade and resettlement policy of the Acadians, 
and too weak, also not raising the Spanish flag or filing the patents registering his governorship. 
Yet Ulloa might have acted seemingly passively for a good reason. In Din’s account, Ulloa’s 
successor, O’Reilly, arrived with more than 2,000 soldiers, and with a demonstration of massive 
force, proudly took possession of Louisiana in the name of the Spanish crown38. Another scholar, 
John Preston Moore, comes to this same conclusion that “had general economic conditions 
within the colony been more favorable and had crown policy been more realistic the date of 
effective Spanish occupation would have been 1766 instead of 1769”.39 Moore seems to write a 
striking defense of Ulloa as someone quite literally fighting a battle unarmed. 
Louisiana thus in many ways echoes the Ulloa’s situation in Huancavelica. He lacked the 
necessary resources to implement reforms. As a personality, Ulloa is raised or condemned 
depending on the scholar. More interesting, however, is the context that results in his so-called 
failure or successes. Attempting to measure Ulloa’s success has diverging results, but analyzing 
his context in relation to Jerónimo de Sola y Fuente might reveal what factors are necessary for 
success.  
Methods and Scope 
The remaining chapters are based in primary research from both Jerónimo de Sola y 
Fuente’s and Antonio de Ulloa y de la Torre-Giral’s Relaciónes. The relación is a report written 
at the end of the governorship, for either the succeeding governor or the king. When he wrote his 
relación, Sola actually chose to publish it. These documents thus are somewhat public records of 
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39John Preston Moore, “Antonio de Ulloa: A Profile of the First Spanish Governor of Louisiana.” Louisiana History: 





administrations, meant to be read by peers or the general, educated public. I use secondary 
research by other historians to supplement their firsthand accounts, and offer analysis comparing 
the issues each governor faced, as well as their resources. I quote extensively from these reports, 
as I find using the governor’s own words to be the most insightful way of analyzing their tenures. 
I believe far too many historians cite mere sentences from sources that are fascinating and 
worthy of longer excerpts, especially when English translations are scarce. I look at three major 
themes: (1) mercury production and economic policy, (2) labor and relationships to the 
indigenous population, as well as (3) each governor’s relationship to the political hierarchy in 
Lima and the mercury guild. I offer enough background information for someone who has never 
studied colonial Peru to understand my research.  
Understandably, the extent of my research is limited. While many scholars are able to 
travel to Archivo General de Indias (AGI) in Seville, I was not. Many sources, including letters 
cited by other scholars, exist there from Sola and Ulloa, or about their tenure in Huancavelica. 
Thus, I acknowledge a limitation on my research, and a reliance on secondary sources to fill 
these gaps. Likewise, as the relación are written by Sola and Ulloa as a sort of self-evaluation, 
with some advice to future governors, they are necessarily problematic sources. It is, in part, in 
their interest to represent their own administration and abilities as best as possible. Throughout 
my research, I consider this inevitable bias. I necessarily couple Sola and Ulloa’s relaciónes with 
other scholars’ evaluations of reputability, as I form my own judgement on the reliability of their 
accounts. 
Finally, I note I am deeply in debt to scholars who have come before me, and I cite them 
generously— especially to Brown, Whitaker, and Pearce. In comparing the two most famous 




looks like in a colonial mercury mine, and perhaps the limitations of a word such as “effective.” I 






Chapter Two: Mercury Production and Economic Management of the Mine 
 
Fig. 1: Timeline of Kings, Viceroys of Peru, and Governors in Huancavelica 
I have not written all this, apparently, pardon the expression, for vanity or arrogance; I believe 
it has been recorded during my entire residence, compared to others, I have been able to so 
easily removed many more quintales of mercury, that I have stopped executing it, for there is not 
enough [comparable] silver [to amalgamate with mercury].40 
 
Introduction 
In order to substantively evaluate Antonio de Ulloa and Jerónimo de Sola as agents of 
reform in Huancavelica, it is necessary to explore the economic administration of Huancavelica, 
its most essential value to the Spanish Crown. Levels of mercury production, lines of credit to 
 
40 No he dilatado toda esta, al parecer, menuda expression, por arrogancia vana; pues créo, se ha hecho constar 
sobradamente en toda mi residencia, la ageno, que he vivido de ella: y que pudiendo con tanta facilidad haver sacado 
muchos mas Quintales de Azogue, lo he dejado de executar, por no haver suficiente Plata para satisfacerlos.  
Sola y Fuente, Jerónimo de., Francisco Guerra, and Imprenta de la Plazuela de San Cristóbal (Lima). Relacion, e 
Informe, Que Haze El Doc. D. Geronymo de Sola y Fuente, Del C. de S.M. En El ... de Las Indias, Governador, Que 
Acaba de Sèr de La Villa, y Mina de Guancavelica, y Superintendente General Del Ramo de Azogues En Todo El 
Reyno Del Perù ... al Señor D. Gaspar de La Cerda y Leyva ..., Su Successor En Estos Empleos, En Que Se Dá 
Cuenta Del Estado, Que Tenía La Real Mina al Tiempo, Que La Recibiò En El Año Passado de Mil Setecientos 
Treynta y Seis, Los Adelantamientos, Con Que Queda, y Todo Lo Demàs, Que Se Necessita Para La Comprension 
de Este Vasto, é Importante Manejo, de Que Se Origina La Subsistencia de Los Reynos Perúanos, Por La 
Habilitación de Sus Minerales de Plata. [8], 105 [i.e. 102], [6] p., [1] h. pleg. En Lima: en la imprenta de la Plazuela 
de San Christoval, 1748. //catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/009348762, 59.  
Hereafter Jerónimo de Sola, Relación e Informe. 
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miners, and the financial management of the mine are all vital measures of effective 
administration in Huancavelica. At the core of both governors’ administrations, however, was 
the Crown’s principal aim to extract as much mercury as possible from Huancavelica. 
Successes and Failures: Paradigms of Jerónimo de Sola and Antonio de Ulloa 
Adrian J. Pearce called Jerónimo de Sola “the most significant of all the Bourbon 
officials” in Huancavelica.41  Sola is repeatedly referred to by the epithet El Restaurador de La 
Mina, or the Restorer of the Mine. Yet, while Sola is consistently mentioned, few scholars focus 
on his governorship, outside of Pearce’s 1999 article. Antonio de Ulloa, in contrast, is by far the 
most studied governor in Huancavelica, with more than half a dozen articles and books on his 
tenure from 1758 to 1763. Pearce condemned the academic interest on Ulloa as “unhelpful, or 
even inappropriate,'' speculating that the attention stems from intrigue on Ulloa’s character, 
rather than any substantive successes, or even relative significance in Huancavelica’s history.42 
In Pearce’s characterization, historians focusing on Ulloa erroneously paint him as a martyr, a 
protagonist who eventually was defeated by “deeply entrenched corrupt interests.”43  
Perhaps historians are fascinated by Ulloa solely because of his cult of personality, an 
esteemed scientist and Enlightened reformist embroiled in personal dramas throughout his life. 
Regardless, one must look to the mercury production and economic administration of 
Huancavelica in order to reach any conclusions about the reformative aims and achievements of 
any governor. The administrative and economic significance of Huancavelica, as well as the 
historical context in which Jerónimo de Sola and Antonio de Ulloa operated, are necessary in 
 
41Adrian J. Pearce, “Huancavelica 1700-1759: Administrative Reform of the Mercury Industry in Early Bourbon 
Peru.” The Hispanic American Historical Review 79, no. 4 (1999): 429. 
42Adrian J. Pearce, “Huancavelica 1563–1824: History and Historiography.” Colonial Latin American Review 22, 
no. 3 (December 1, 2013): 422–40. https://doi.org/10.1080/10609164.2013.808467. 
43Alfonso W. Quiroz, Corrupt Circles : A History of Unbound Graft in Peru. Book. (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow 





evaluating how one governor restored the mine and even generated a surplus of mercury, while 
another is repeatedly disparaged as an ultimately un fracaso— a failure.44 This chapter aims to 
contextualize the economic significance of Huancavelica’s mercury, as well as the administrative 
shifts that affected mercury production under previous governorships. Both Jerónimo de Sola 
and Antonio de Ulloa are evaluated in terms of accessible credit and mercury production. 
Brief History of the Huancavelica Mercury Mine and its Economic Significance 
 Situated at an elevation of 12,530 feet, Huancavelica was the only significant mercury 
mine in Spanish America, from its discovery in 1563 to its abandonment in 1813. The mine itself 
is called Santa Bárbara, but is more generally referred to as Huancavelica.45 The only 
comparable levels of mercury could be found in the Almadén mine in Spain, and Idrija, located 
in modern-day Slovenia.46 Mercury was an essential part of the Spanish, and indeed, global 
economy; mercury was a vital ingredient in processing silver.47 John TePaske estimated that 
between 1492 and 1810 in the Iberian new world, nearly 190 million pounds (86 million 
kilograms) of fine silver was produced.48 In total, Huancavelica produced 55,000 tons of mercury 
between 1565-1813, not including contraband.49 Some scholars speculate the actual figure is 
 
44 Miguel Molina Martínez, Antonio de Ulloa En Huancavelica. (Granada: Universidad de Granada, 1995). 
45This thesis will refer to the mine as Huancavelica. 
46 Arthur P Whitaker, The Huancavelica Mercury Mine: a Contribution to the History of the Bourbon Renaissance 
in the Spanish Empire, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1941), 5. 
47 Silver production today rarely uses the mercury amalgation method. Instead, the cyanide (also called heap leach) 
process is more common.  
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http://www.madehow.com/Volume-3/Silver.html. 
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more than double that, when accounting for smuggling and misreporting.50 Likely, the figure is 
closer to an extra third, or roughly 73,000 tons of mercury.51 
The Amalgamation Method: Silver and Mercury 
Potosí, the most famous of all Spanish silver mines, was reliant on Huancavelica’s 
mercury. One sixteenth-century chronicler called Huancavelica and Potosí “the most important 
marriage in the world.”52 Prior to the sixteenth century, gold and silver were refined through 
smelting, which does not require mercury, but did necessitate large amounts of firewood. 
Huancavelica is located on the altiplano: treeless, with a very high altitude, and little vegetation. 
Wood was rare, and expensive. In 1555, Bartolomé de Medina learned of the amalgamation 
method, commonly known as the patio method, which was more efficient, and popularized the 
practice in New Spain. Pliny the Elder wrote of the method in the Middle Ages, and in the 
fifteenth century, German metallurgists re-discovered the process.53 Medina then brought it to 
the silver mines in Pachuca in New Spain, and the practice spread throughout the Spanish 
Americas. Ore (any deposit in which a precious mineral could be extracted) would be ground up, 
mixed with salt, lime, water, and a copper-iron mix called magistral. Mercury was added, and 
workers would tread the mixture over several days. This mixture would be washed, heated, and 
the mercury would evaporate, which would separate the precious metal—silver— from the ore. 
Through the amalgamation process, lesser grade ores could be used, and far less firewood was 
needed. More silver and gold could be extracted from the same mines for less money and time. 
All of Potosí’s readily available, almost-pure silver was already extracted by 1555: from then on, 
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Potosí needed the amalgamation process to keep producing silver.54 In 1570, before the 
amalgamation method was widespread, the treasury office (Caja) recorded 11,000 pesos on the 
quinto real, or royal fifth tax. Nine years later, after processing silver with mercury, the quinto 
real increased to over 1,000,000 pesos, a 900% increase in tax revenue.55 Huancavelica was 
indispensable in supplying the necessary mercury to maintain silver production, economically 
vital to Spain. 
The ambitious late sixteenth-century viceroy of Peru, Francisco de Toledo quickly 
expropriated the Huancavelica mine to royal ownership, given mercury’s economic importance. 
Interestingly, however, Toledo leased operations of the mine at Huancavelica to the gremio de 
mineros, or miners’ guild, rather than a system of direct royal extraction.56 The gremio would 
operate as a delegated system of mercury production. The Crown was located far across the 
Atlantic, so the gremio system would ideally lower operation costs. The miners would exploit 
and smelt the ore at their own expense. By law, the miners then would be required to sell all the 
mercury produced to the Crown at a price previously fixed through un asiento, or contract. The 
Quinto Real, or royal fifth, would be withheld as taxation. The mercury would then be resold to 
the Potosí miners at a higher price. In exchange, the Crown would provide Huancavelica’s 
miners with indigenous labor, through a drafting system called the mita, as well as sending 
advanced funds to cover the operational cost and upkeep of the mine. 
Economic Crisis of the Early Eighteenth Century, and Prefacing Reform 
 During the early eighteenth century, the Spanish empire underwent massive socio-
political transformations. After the War of Spanish Succession, lasting from 1702 to 1715, the 
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Spanish Habsburg monarchy transitioned to the Bourbon dynasty. Weakened from war, Spain 
“could spare neither attention nor resources” in its American colonies.57 The financial crisis was 
so dire that Spain’s principal colonial administrators, the ministers of the Consejo de Indias, had 
not been paid since 1698.58 Yet, the war that imposed “great strain”, also resulted in a new 
dynasty with a “new zeal for reform.”59 This zeal was in part a reaction to the chaos following 
the war. The initial royal response to the financial crisis of the War of Spanish Succession was 
disastrous, and laid the groundwork for years of entrenched corruption. The sale of offices, 
including the governorship in Huancavelica, dramatically increased, in an effort to regain funds 
and curtail ballooning royal debt. King Felipe V even went so far as to sell 2,000 quintals of 
Almadén’s mercury to France, under the stipulation the mercury would only be used within 
France. As mercury is necessary to process silver, and contraband and piracy was rising in the 
Americas in the early eighteenth century, Felipe’s stipulation was dubious at best. Without 
doubt, the mercury was used to illicitly smuggle Spanish American silver.60 The first truly global 
war, the War of Spanish Succession involved “enormous expenses in support of professional 
armies equipped with the latest, and most expensive, means of killing each other”, with armies 
traveling large distances and requiring extensive logistical support. Spain’s financial 
restructuring after the war involved “essentially by turning control of the continued silver 
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imports from Spanish America to court favorites.”61 These short-term financial solutions led to 
lasting consequences across the Atlantic. 
Selling administrative posts did not yield the most honest or effective leaders in Spanish 
Americas. Widespread contraband and fraud ensued among the new officeholders, boiling down 
to an illicit cash grab. Combined, selling administrative posts and insecure transatlantic trade 
escalated the pre-existing economic crisis, decreasing Spain’s revenue from New World tax 
revenue, as administrators who purchased their posts were more likely to abuse them.62  
 
Fig. 2: Mercury production in Huancavelica 1675-1720 
Source: Kendall Brown, "La Crisis Financiera Peruana Al Comienzo Del Siglo XVIII, La Minería De Plata y La 
Mina De Azogues De Huancavélica." Revista De Indias 48, (1988): 361.  
Brown cites to John J TePaske and Herbert S Klein, Treasuries of the Spanish Empire in America, 3 volumes 
(Durham, N.C., 1982), I, 335-350, and “Relación del azogue que se ha sacado de esta Real Minda de 
Guancavelica, desde el año de 1571 hasta el de 1724” Relación hecha por el Marqués de Casa Concha a su 
successor, el Doctor Alvaro Cavero, gobernadora de Huancavelica, AGI, Lima, 469.  
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Larry Neal, 147–68. Macroeconomic Policy Making. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
62  Jenny Guardado “Office-selling, corruption, and long-term development in Peru.” The American Political 
Science Review 112, no.4, 2019, 971-995. doi:http://dx.doi.org.proxy.lib.umich.edu/10.1017/S000305541800045X 
Guardado successfully analyzes data of administrators who bought their posts and finds provinces with greater 
































To compound the economic crisis, mercury production in Huancavelica fell drastically 
during this period. From 1660-1679, mercury production averaged 5,200 quintals. This number 
fell to 4,110 from 1679-1689, and then recovered a bit with the asiento underneath the viceroy 
Duque de Palata, but plummeted again to 3,059 quintals in 1701, where production remained for 
the next two decades.63 This is a 42 percent drop in production in a generation. The new asiento 
by the Duque de Palata lasted some 70 years, contracting the Crown to advance 125,000 pesos to 
the gremio. The reform was an effort to support mercury miners, who without credit were unable 
to finance their operation; the money fronted by the Crown should be recouped once the mercury 
was produced and sold to the Crown. The credit was earmarked from taxes on maritime trade, 
then considered the most reliable income. Yet, by the end of the 1680s, maritime trade was less 
reliable than expected, and thus the Crown owed the gremio more than one million pesos in 
promised credit.  
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Fig. 3: Pesos de ocho remitted from the Caja (treasury) in Lima 1675-1720 
Source: Kendall Brown, "La Crisis Financiera Peruana Al Comienzo Del Siglo XVIII, La Minería De Plata y La 
Mina De Azogues De Huancavélica." Revista De Indias 48, (1988): 361.  
Brown cites to John J TePaske and Herbert S Klein, Treasuries of the Spanish Empire in America, 3 volumes 
(Durham, N.C., 1982), I, 335-350, and “Relación del azogue que se ha sacado de esta Real Minda de 
Guancavelica, desde el año de 1571 hasta el de 1724” Relación hecha por el Marqués de Casa Concha a su 
successor, el Doctor Alvaro Cavero, gobernadora de Huancavelica, AGI, Lima, 469. 
 
Without credit, most miners could not finance their own operations. The gremio were 
surprisingly economically diverse, with some wealthy descendants of the original miners, but 
others of more modest means. Operational accounts, such as paying workers, purchasing 
necessary equipment, and providing repairs required sufficient funding, yet, consistently the 
guild was underfunded. Especially during the invernada, or wet season from January to April, 
miners could not process mercury and therefore were more financially insecure. 
Various strategies were used to secure operational funds to continue mining, with each 
short-term solution as destructive as the last, jeopardizing the long-term stability of Huancavelica 
and the financial income of the Crown. The gremio members were forced to rely on private 


































season, especially during the invernada from January to April, when ore could be extracted but 
not processed. In return, the aviadores would receive the produced mercury at a going rate below 
the negotiated contract with the Crown. In the 1720s, aviadores were sold mercury at 40 pesos 
per quintal, which they could sell back to the Crown at 58 pesos per quintal64, netting an 18 peso 
profit. However, many aviadores chose not to sell to the official royal treasury, or Real Caja. 
The institution was unreliable and not particularly timely in payment; these were the same issues 
that forced the gremio to find alternative funding without the promised royal lines of credit.  
Instead, the aviadores would sell the mercury illegally to Potosí miners. All mercury was the 
Crown’s to distribute; thus, aviadores should have had no role in mercury sales. Yet, because the 
Quinto Real was taxed based on the sale of mercury, and not silver, the use of aviadores proved 
extremely valuable in smuggling not only mercury, but silver as well.   
Worse yet, the system of debt reversed itself in the 1680s; the gremio owed money to the 
Crown, and Huancavelica’s governors only exacerbated the problem. Private credit continued to 
supplement royal payments under the asiento, with the result being decreased profits for the 
guild. When royal supplements eventually arrived, the guild had insufficient funds to repay the 
debt. Aviadores would illegally purchase the mercury at the discounted price, but so would 
governors. Many governors even lied about the amount of funds in the Caja Real, claiming not 
to have official funds to advance, and instead offering to purchase the mercury personally, at a 
discount, under the guise of a personal favor to the miners. These governors would then resell the 
mercury at a profit, for the full price negotiated by the asiento, if the funds were available in the 
Caja Real. If the funds were not immediately available, their post as governor allowed them to 
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privilege their payment first once the pesos arrived. Higher authorities in Lima, including the 
Viceroy, would sometimes split the profit with the governors. Thus, in the late seventeenth and 
early eighteenth centuries, Huancavelica’s economic crisis had multiple faces, each as 
problematic as the last: the increased sale of offices, the falling production rate, decreased 
stability in royal credit, and growing corruption among miners, merchants, and governors alike. 
The early eighteenth century was thus a chaotic and unregulated system, unable to provide 
sufficient, consistent mercury to process silver to finance the Spanish empire. 
Early Reforms and the Marquis de Casa Concha (1723-26)  
During the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century, as a result of the financial 
policies following the War of Spanish Succession, Huancavelica was rife with contraband, 
corrupt officials, and struggling with decreased mercury production. Dramatic administrative 
reforms attempted to curb the financial crisis. In 1719, Felipe V appointed the Marquis de Casa 
Concha, José de Santiago Concha y Salvatierra65, as the first to operate as the General 
Superintendent Judge of Azogues, with private jurisdiction from the viceroy and audiencia in 
Lima. Authorities in Lima disliked the new system, which redistributed power to the governor 
that was traditionally theirs. The viceroy Diego Morcillo was particularly irate66. Ideally, the new 
Superintendency would have exclusive control over all revenue created by the mine (el ramo de 
azogues), as well as collection of the Quinto Real. Other reforms included abolishing the mita in 
favor of a combination of free-wage labor and prison laborers. Casa Concha would be the first in 
a system of rotational oidor (a judge in the audiencia de Lima) appointments, in comparison to 
 
65 Most documents refer to him as simply Casa Concha; I follow suit. 
66On Casa Concha’s control of silver revenue, the Viceroy Morcillo said, it was a system "that leaves the high office 
of viceroy without the power or rights to use these funds in whatever may be of service to the crown.”  
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the previous system where the viceroy directly appointed governors. These short-term 
appointments were supposed to lend greater independency from the corruption of the viceroys.  
The Crown was only partially successful in restructuring Huancavelica to be more 
independent from Lima. The attempted reforms were just that: attempted. Casa Concha did not 
abolish the mita. Instead, he claimed an epidemic caused a labor shortage, and the proposed 
policy was withdrawn by 1725. Likewise, the viceroy Morcillo refused to allow the 
Superintendent direct control of the quinto real, condemning the reform as a direct assault to the 
authority of the viceroy. The reforms of Casa Concha show a distinctly Bourbon theme of 
attempting to realign a more direct line of control from the Americas to the Crown. Some of 
these reforms, such as the abolishment of the mita and direct taxation efforts, could not or would 
not be implemented, due to resistance by both the audiencia and gremio. 
Yet, there was also middling success. Casa Concha created a new system of credit to the 
gremio which both historians and future governors called the premier success of his 
administration. His Relación, or report to the Crown, was widely read and served as a sort of 
manual of good administration in Huancavelica. The new credit system retained the 125,000 
pesos and 620 mitayos prescribed from the 1681 asiento crafted by the Duque de Palata. The 
cash advance paid for mitayo salaries, and ratas y desmontes, the repairs to the mine. Casa 
Concha introduced a further supplement to be paid during the invernada season, when credit was 
most needed; this measure combated the power of the aviadores, who preyed upon miners during 
the vulnerable season. Additionally, Casa Concha created a new policy in which all remaining 
mercury, after repayment of royal credit, be purchased at a lower rate of 40 pesos a quintal. The 




instable, cyclical problem of credit. This new policy generated 55,000 pesos during Casa 
Concha’s administration alone.  
Heir to Casa Concha: Jerónimo de Sola 
In a natural continuation from the reforms of Casa Concha, Jerónimo de Sola marked 
another pivotal transition in the governorship of Huancavelica. Instead of a rotational system 
based on seniority in the oidores from Lima, the king would appoint the new governor directly. 
This appointment system was the first complete separation from the audiencia and viceroy. No 
doubt this was in part because of the complicity of the viceroy in various credit schemes by 
governors in the seventeenth century.  In addition, the new governor was given exclusive control 
over the ramo de azogue, or the funds generated by mercury, and ordered to guarantee an annual 
production of 5,000 quintals of mercury. Sola had experience working in the mines at Almadén, 
was also a member of the Consejo de Hacienda, the Finance Council, and later was appointed to 
the Consejo de Indias itself. His governorship marked the beginning of high ranking peninsular, 
or Spanish born elite, officials being named governor, a pattern that continued until the 1760s.67 
A New Contract: Asiento under Sola 
Jerónimo de Sola extended the credit system created under Casa Concha, writing that the 
credit system was “without a doubt the most noteworthy accomplishment during his time.”68 The 
credit system would now be applied to the poorer members of the Guild. Sola wrote, 
As I am commonly informed, he [Casa Concha] did not practice what he says in his 
Relación, and did not include those who were Poor in this relief; Well, everyone was 
certainly given the corresponding reflection on their work, and with the same necessary 
credit,  and so I have continued and applied Silver to their debt, mediating for this alone 
 
67Pearce, Adrian J. “Huancavelica 1700-1759: Administrative Reform of the Mercury Industry in Early Bourbon 
Peru.” The Hispanic American Historical Review 79, no. 4 (1999): 429. 
68 Sola wrote “sin duda se debe al mayor reconocimiento a su memoria.”  




the prudent general rule of good governance, because no other parties have been 
harmed.69 
 Socorro, or aid, was not applied to poorer members of the guild under Casa Concha, 
Sola wrote, based off the previous governor’s Relación. In addition, Jerónimo de Sola added 
another 96,000 pesos of revenue to the crown, compared to Casa Concha’s 55,000, through the 
aforementioned system of remaining mercury being purchased at 40 pesos a quintal.  
This new, extended system of credit to poorer miners is vital in measuring Sola’s efficacy 
as a reformer. Adrian Pearce notes the direct correlation between scarcity of credit and drops in 
mercury production and increase in contraband production.70 Thus, the new credit lines available 
to members of the guild, especially poorer ones, was exceptionally important under Sola. In part, 
this credit contributed to the lucrative production levels during his governorship.  
Mercury Production under Sola 
Jerónimo de Sola’s tenure had various measurable successes. In his twelve years as 
governor, there was a 20 percent increase in the total mercury output of the mine.71 Sola also 
oversaw substantial enlargement of the mine’s tunnels and chambers. His charge by the King 
was to produce 5,000 quintals of mercury, and the annual average remained quite close to that 
number. In an illuminating example, most of the mercury supplied to modern-day Mexico (then 
the viceroyalty of New Spain) came from the Almadén mine in Spain, which was shipped across 
the Atlantic. Huancavelica supplied the silver mines in Perú. In 1741, when the War of Jenkins’ 
Ear destabilized maritime trade, Sola could supply New Spain with 4,000 quintals. Kendall 
 
69“Aunque segun se me informa comunmente, no practicó, lo que assegura en su Relacion, de no incluír en este 
socorro, a los que eran Pobres; pues a todo se dió desde luego con la correspondiente reflexion a su trabajo, y con 
igual pension se ha continuado, estando siempre a la mira, de que se aplique la Plata a su destino, mediando para 
esto sola la prudente general regla de buen Govierno, porque no se han perjudicado los demás compañeros” 
Jerónimo de Sola, Relación e Informe, 78. 
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Brown estimates that from 1700 to 1750, Mexican silver mines produced three times as much 
silver as their Peruvian counterparts, and to have enough mercury to process that load is no small 
feat.72  Sola even offered an additional 2,000 quintals.  
Mercury Production under Ulloa 
The reforming tide under the Bourbon dynasty went in fits and bursts. That is to say, not 
every governor had the integrity or Enlightened spirit of Casa Concha or Jerónimo de Sola. The 
governor immediately preceding Ulloa was Pablo de la Vega, an interim governor from 1755-
1758. Ulloa condemned Vega as a complete disaster and disgrace. Vega supposedly went so far 
as to sell bootleg mercury in the town square.73 Profits, according to the miners, declined 
significantly since the governorship of Gaspar Cerda y Leyda, from 1748 to 1754. Yet, Ulloa’s 
tenure marked an upswing in mercury production. In the 2017 application to become a world 
heritage site, the Permanent Delegation of Peru notes that while the mine collapsed and was 
virtually abandoned by the early nineteenth century, there was a “with a brief upturn in mid-
XVIII century (1758-1764 approximately).”74 During those six years, Antonio de Ulloa was 
governor.  
It would be misleading to call Ulloa an absolute success in Huancavelica. Yet, in terms of 
actual mercury production, there is little else to call him. During Antonio de Ulloa’s six years as 
governor, the Huancavelica mine produced 389,810 quintals of mercury. 75 The royal accountant 
Tomás Ortiz de Landázuri recognized this production was an extraordinary amount. It was the 
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highest production of mercury in the six years preceding his term, as well as the six years after. 
In subsequent accounts of Ulloa’s tenure, little emphasis seems to be placed on an empirical 
truth: during his tenure, Huancavelica produced substantially more mercury. 
Ulloa’s Aid and Contempt to the Gremio 
Antonio de Ulloa, like Casa Concha and Jerónimo de Sola before him, was well aware of 
the need to keep members of the Gremio supplied with enough credit. In his Relación, he wrote,  
I consulted first with my predecessor, and one of the royal officers… finding no other 
way, I consulted the viceroy. He did not understand the decaying state of the mine, and 
matters would only worsen if he did not take steps against the inaccurate reports Vega 
made to him… I again ordered royal officers to administer this aid to the Gremio with the 
proportion of what I said.76  
Simultaneously, however, Ulloa notes the confrontations he often had with members of 
the guild, saying “if I were to say the ingratitude with which this and other benefits have been 
reciprocated with that I have attempted to give the miners, procuring to you how many 
disagreements we have had, it would never end.”77 Perhaps these conflicts overshadow Ulloa as 
someone who was repeatedly in conflict with the guild. Yet, he advocated for them, as well; he 
continuously sought out sufficient aid, even after facing obstacles from royal officials. Ulloa was 
not consistently combative towards the gremio, although other historians note his There exists a 
 
76Lo consulté primero con el antecessor y con el uno de los oficiales reales; el primero lo repugnó acérrimamente, 
porque esto no combenía a sus intentos; el oficial real fue de opinión que no había medio más adequado para 
auxiliarlos y darles estímulo al trabajo; y no hallando yo otro camino, hize consulta sobre ello al virrey conde de 
Superunda. Éste, que no comprehendía bien el estado decadente en que estaban y que era impocible que siguiese la 
avilitación de azoguez si no se tomaba algún medio por estar imprecionado en los informes siniestros que el 
antecesor Vega le había hecho, ni aprobó ni reprobó la providencia, sólo dixo en su repuesta ser necesario manejar 
con mucho tiento los caudales del herario para con los mineros, pero viendo que los clamores crecían y que las 
entradas de azogue disminuían sensiblemente, me resolví a ello, y cumplidos los primeros 6 meses de correr los 
hornos, en decreto de 17 de enero de 1759, ordené a los oficiales reales que subministrasen al Gremio este auxilio 
con la proporción que dejo dicho. 
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(1758-1763).” Book. Lima, Perú: Banco Central de Reserva del Perú : Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 2016, 137. 
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77Si hubiese de decir la ingratitud con que an sido correspondidos éste y otros beneficios con que he atendido a los 
mineros, procurándoles quantos desaogos han estado de mi parte, sería nunca acabar. 





complexity to Ulloa that warrants explanation. He did consistently battle with some members of 
the gremio, yet simultaneously had many members who supported him, such as the exorbitantly 
wealthy Gaspar Alejo de Mendiolaza. Yet, his position as governor was to extract as much 
mercury as possible, and curtail corruption. Without credit, miners had to turn to aviadores, 
which created a higher likelihood for missing or undertaxed mercury. Even if Ulloa hated the 
guild in its entirety, as he himself continuously insults them throughout the relación, he fought 
for their interests as they aligned with his, in reforming the integrity of mining operations to 
extract more mercury for Spain. 
Ulloa understood the necessity of credit to miners and making sure there was enough 
funds available to keep mercury production profitable. In fact, he abolished the quinto real at the 
pleading of the miners, who were unable to afford productions cost with such low quality, 
extinguished ore left in the mine. Abolishing the quinto seems a calculated move by Ulloa to 
discourage contraband sales, to remove the levy placed by the Crown, and one that is not without 
historic precedent; the quinto real was previously sliced in half to a decimizo, or ten percent 
rather than twenty, in order to encourage mineral production. It should also be noted that the 
quinto was temporarily suspended by Ulloa; its abolition was eventually approved formally by 
the Audiencia in Lima. 
The Minería del Rey Experiment 
In the same reforming spirit, Ulloa attempted to restructure the gremio under his direct 
supervision. Called la Minería del Rey, Ulloa established the company in 1759. Rather than 
individual miners operating their own veins, the Minería would act as a whole. More direct 
supervision by the governor would hopefully stimulate mercury production. However, Whitaker 




legal standing was flimsy. Gremio members saw the Minería as royal expropriation. The 
governor was merely a supervisor to the guild, while the entire production process was handled 
by the miners themselves. The veedores, or inspectors, were also paid by the guild themselves, 
thereby creating a very real conflict of interest. 
Ullo wrote in his Relación to Charles III, 
The Mining Guild was in the greatest disorder; the misery made them not cease in their 
clamor and for that reason they did not allow me to improve the output of mercury, nor 
was there anyone who wanted to mine the lowest grade ore, which was the most 
common; the scourge that was mined was little compared to what was needed, and I 
found no way to increase it. This difficulty caused me to start mining by quenta of the 
commonwealth, to which I gave the name of King's Mining in attention that all the 
expenses that were caused by it, were supplied by the Royal Caxa under the sworn 
relations they presented the stewards of mine and the receipts, received and examined by 
me, and the scourge that was produced was taken to the Royal Warehouses every week, 
as is done with that of the miners, serving in payment of the amounts that were advanced, 
but the losses and gains were borne by the total of the Guild.78 
 The Guild was refusing to operate the areas of the mine with perceived poor stores of 
mercury, and in an effort to increase output, the aforementioned Minería del Rey was created. 
Ulloa, rather than individual miners and veedores, could directly supervise the expenses, the 
production, and the work done in areas of the mine that were more hidden. 
Drawing Meaning: Economic Success, Administrative Limitations 
 Both Jerónimo de Sola and Antonio de Ulloa had tangible successes. The gremio’s debt 
to the Crown remained similar under both, but production of mercury increased. However, there 
were also substantive differences in the post’s capabilities under Sola as compared to Ulloa. 
 
78El Gremio de Mineros estaba en la mayor inopia; la miseria les hacía no cesar en sus clamores y por esto no 
conceguían que mexorase la piedra del azogue, ni había quien quiciese trabajar en las labores de baxa ley, que era el 
mayor número; el azogue que se conceguía era poco respecto del que se necesitaba, y yo no descubría camino para 
acrecentarlo. Esta dificultad me hizo entablar una minería por quenta de la mancomunidad, a la qual le dí el nombre 
de Minería de Rey eneatttención a que todos los gastos que se causaban en ella, se suplían por la Caxa Real en virtud 
de las relaciones juradas que presentaban los mayordomos de mina y del asiento de hornos, recevidas y examinadas 
por mí, y el azogue que producía se llevaba a los Almacenes Reales todas las semanas, como se hace con el de los 
mineros, sirbiendo en pago de las cantidades que se tenían adelantadas, pero las pérdidas y ganancias eran de quenta 
de la mancomunidad del Gremio. 




Sola’s position was vastly more powerful than Ulloa’s, as he had almost entirely autonomous 
control over a branch of the viceregal exchequer. He controlled the ramo de azogues, and could 
use those funds to do much needed repairs to the mine.  In 1751, a royal decree returned control 
of the ramo de azogues to the audiencia; thus, when Ulloa abolished the quinto, it was only 
temporarily until the audiencia agreed. From 1722 to 1748, Lima’s audiencia always advanced 
sufficient funds in order to provide the gremio money for laborers, repairs, and the invernada 
season. With the ramo de azogues no longer being legally under the governor of Huancavelica’s 
control, there was no such binding authority79  Similarly, the construction of the Minería del Rey 
was based on Ulloa’s own strategic efforts, yet was not without precedent. Gaspar de Cerda 
(1748-1754), who nominally had the same powers as his predecessor Sola, wanted to create a 
quite similar system, named the Compañia de Azogues. The viceroy at the time, Manso de 
Velasco, refused the idea. Even with the legal authority, Cerda could not enact the direct 
supervisory role that Ulloa later would with the Minería del Rey. More direct control was vital to 
managing Huancavelica, as was managing lines of credit to disparage corruption and fraud in the 
mine. The previous decentralized system of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth-century 
resulted in chaos. The administrative authority each governor had in performing these acts is thus 
vital in understanding the levels of mercury production, as well as the conflicts Sola and Ulloa 
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So many honors have been conferred to my merit, it would make me blush to repeat them here… 
The utilities, which I have expressed, of the new methods of work have resulted in the security of 
the mine, are difficult to describe in their entirety, as I desire to maintain the brevity of this 
report.80 
  
Chapter Three: Labor and Working Conditions in Huancavelica 
Introduction 
In chapter three, I will discuss the labor conditions in Huancavelica, focusing especially 
on the mita or draft labor system, and workers’ health conditions. I attempt to analyze each 
governor’s relationship to the local indigenous population (indios). As both Ulloa and Sola are 
repeatedly and contradictorily praised and chastised by historians, I aim to paint a more balanced 
portrait, of two governors who had more in common than not, and were faced with similar 
challenges in administering a mercury mine. I also push against a more forgiving narrative that in 
later years, the mita and more generally working conditions were humane in Huancavelica. To 
start, I will introduce the history of the mita in Peru. I also summarize the scholarship on colonial 
mercury mining and workers’ health. I end the chapter with a description of labor conditions and 
attitudes during first Sola’s, and then Ulloa’s, governorships of Huancavelica. Ultimately, I 
conclude that Sola and Ulloa’s descriptions of improved workers’ health should be understood in 
the context of earlier conditions, and reaffirm the inhumanity of the mining conditions under 
both governors. I do not think the existence of alquilas necessarily equates to fair working 
conditions in the eighteenth century. While free-wage labor replaced much of the mita in the 
eighteenth century, more research must be done to explain why this shift occurred.  
Mit’a: Turn for the Worst 
 
80“con unas tan honoras expressiones a la cortedad de mi merito, que me causara bastante rubor repetirlas aqui…. 
Las utilidades, que del expressado, nuevo methodo de trabajo han resultado, supuesta la seguridad, con que se ha 
establecido, son dificiles de exponerse todas, deséando la posibile brevedad del Informe.”  




To start, a basic framework of the mita system is necessary. Thus far, the mita is 
mentioned only in second chapter of this thesis, discussing the governor Casa Concha’s refusal 
to abolish the system under Felipe V. In itself, there is some flexibility and autonomy given to a 
Huancavelican  governorship, given that Casa Concha’s was able to refuse such a reform. Much 
autonomy was given to each governor, if direct royal requests were able to be ignored by a 
governor. 
The word mit’a (or the Hispanized mita) comes from Quechua, one of the many of 
indigenous languages of Peru and spoken by the Inca. Mit’a translates roughly to “turn.” Under 
the Inca, whose empire lasted nearly four hundred years, the mit’a was an obligatory rotational 
work system. Like a corvée, the mit’a maintained a complex system of Incan highways, 
including the upkeep of tampus, or rest stops along the highway system. The mit’a was also 
predated by a smaller scale communal labor system, within individual villages, that exists still, 
and is called minka or faena in Spanish. After the Spanish conquest, which lasted from 1532 
until the early 1570s, the mit’a system was adapted to fit Spanish preferences: namely, the 
extraction of precious metals.  
The famous viceroy of Peru, Francisco de Toledo, constructed the Spanish adaptation of 
the mita. One seventh of eligible indigenous men were obliged to work, with special emphasis in 
agricultural and mining sectors. The first Spanish mita was in 1573, and worked in the silver 
mines in Potosí, from regions surrounding the mine. In Huancavelica, the mita provinces were 
from the central mountains, and included Tarma, Jauja, and Yauyos in the north, Castrovirreina, 
Lucanas, Vilcashuamain, Andahuaylas, Chumbivilcas, Cotabambas, and Aymaraes to the South, 






Fig. 4: First Map of the Santa Bárbara Mine by Antonio de Ulloa 1758 
 
81 Antonio de Ulloa, de la Rl. Mina de Azogue en el Cerro de Santa Barbara distante de la Villa de Guancavelica una 
legua, en los Reinos del Perú [Material cartográfico] : Primera Parte que demuestra desde lo mas alto de la Mina en 
la Cumbre del Cerro que llaman el Brocal hasta el Socabon Real de Belem, en donde ay un Pueblo con el nombre de 
Santa Bárbara / Formado por el Governador Superintte. de dha. Mina Don Antonio de Ulloa Enel año 1758, primero 





Royal and Clerical Debates Surrounding the Mita 
From the outset, the mita was a source of contention. The question of the indios and their 
place in Spanish rule was never fully answered. The Spanish court and the clergy82 had an 
ongoing, and often contradictory debate about the status of indigenous in the Americas.  In 1500, 
King Ferdinand II prohibited native slavery under any circumstances, but in 1503 allowed for 
“coerced labor” “for limited periods of time.”83 In 1534, Carlos I allowed indigenous peoples to 
be enslaved after a “just” war84, but under the 1543 New Laws, Carlos I reversed his position, 
prohibiting the enslavement of indigenous peoples. In the wake of the New Laws, various 
encomenderos rebelled in Peru, cumulating in the death of Gonzalo Pizarro, half-brother of 
conquistador Francisco Pizarro. In 1570, the Viceroy Toledo recognized the controversy, and 
called a tribunal of clergy, jurists, and other officials to debate the mita; the council unanimously 
ratified the system. Despite this, the issue was not placed at rest. In fact, soon after, many clergy 
members who ruled in favor of the mita later recanted this decision.  
Simultaneously, religious justifications were common in Catholic Spain. Various friars 
would justify the mita system as morally different than slavery. Some went as far as to justify the 
labor as a fair price, in exchange for religious salvation. Ecclesiastical colonial figures would 
acknowledge the abysmal mortality rate of the mita, but simultaneously defend its existence as 
necessary, and even good. José de Acosta (1540-1600), the famous Jesuit missionary, wrote “It is 
a fact that the silver mines were a cemetery of Indians. Many thousands have died from this type 
of work… And what are we going to say about the mining of mercury? By only breathing, even 
 
82Religion and the monarchy were fundamentally intertwined during this period, thus framing royal and 
ecclesiastical debates are not so much seperate categories but different emphases.  
83Nicholas Robins, Mercury, Mining, and Empire : The Human and Ecological Cost of Colonial Silver Mining in the 
Andes (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2011),  67. 
84This included the 1513 Requerimiento, a document read to indigenous people requiring them to accept Spanish 
rule and convert to Catholicism. In 1500, indigenous people were granted the title of free vassals, except under just 




lightly, the vapors produced by the refining… [it is] instant death.” Yet, as historian Nicholas 
Robins notes, “Despite this, like the vast majority of [Acosta’s] peers, he argued that if the laws 
were only followed then ‘there is nothing bad about the mita.’” The mita itself was not the 
problem, but rather the administration. According to Acosta, if there were proper leadership and 
execution, the mitayos could be treated fairly, even in a system of forced labor. 
A contemporary of Acosta, Juan de Solózano Pereira, an oidor of Lima85 and governor of 
Huancavelica, was a prolific writer on colonial law in the Spanish Americas. Similar to Acosta, 
he acknowledged the danger of the mita, but justified it as necessary, inevitable, and religiously 
sanctioned:  "The Indies, so Solóranzo opinionated, were like the fourth empire of the prophet 
David, its feet and foundations built on clay, and the Indians best compared to the children of 
Israel labouring for Pharaoh in Egypt." Many friars argued that indigenous peoples’ labor was 
ultimately the price of conversion and eternal salvation. God had commissioned Spain to create a 
gilded empire, and provided the workers and the gold to boot. 
 Ultimately, the mita was ratified in 1589 by King Philip II, sixteen years after the first 
drafted laborers arrived in Potosí. One-seventh of the eligible tributary population— able bodied 
males, aged eighteen to fifty— were required to work86 by Spanish law. Since mining work was 
traditionally reserved only for criminals and slaves, the justification of the mita as morally and 
legally sound has resounding consequences for how labor would be constructed in Huancavelica. 
The legal question was put to rest. Yet, the mita was not universally accepted; many 
indigenous workers and their representatives fought what amounted to a death sentence. Steve 
Stern notes the various ways in which curaca (indigenous leaders) would appeal or fight against 
 
85All governors of Lima were oidores at this time. For more on Huancavelican political and economic 
administration, see chapter 2. 
86Nicholas Robins, Mercury, Mining, and Empire : The Human and Ecological Cost of Colonial Silver Mining in the 




the mita system. In his book, Peru’s Indian peoples and the Challenge of Spanish Conquest, 
Stern wrote, “By petitioning for revistas (reinspections) of their populations, native peoples 
lowered their legal tribute and mita quotas in accordance with real and pretended demographic 
decline.”87 Stern estimates that at least ten, but probably more, of the twenty core repartimientos 
(relocated towns of indigenous peoples) had their mita quotas lowered. He described in some 
detail curaca who sued for three years to avoid one mitayo de plaza in Huancavelica in the early 
1600s. A mita de plaza would serve a lord in the household or in agricultural work, rather than in 
the mine. Indigenous leaders left an impressive historical record of petitions to lower the mita 
requirement, and sometimes were quite successful in lowering their obligation in persuasive 
procedural claims.88 
In the historiographical record, historians have debated that the mita system became an 
obstacle in developing the mining industry, because labor was so much cheaper with a mita 
instead of actual market price. The Duque de Palata claimed the only two components necessary 
to govern Huancavelica were credit and the 620 mitayos.89 Perhaps the state-paid labor kept the 
true cost of mining hidden, and thus led to later difficulties in administration. However, other 
scholars argue that the costs of mining in Potosí and Huancavelica continued to promote the mita 
as necessary, as free wage labor was too expensive on a large scale, as was convict labor.  
Almadén, the preeminent mercury mine in peninsular Spain, used convict labor starting 
in 1566; indeed, historian Ning Ma speculates Don Quixote’s image of galley slaves were 
 
87Steve J Stern, Peru’s Indian Peoples and the Challenge of Spanish Conquest : Huamanga to 1640. (Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1982), 123. 
88For more on indigenous elites use of the court system in colonial Peru, see Garrett, David T. “‘His Majesty’s Most 
Loyal Vassals’: The Indian Nobility and Tupac Amaru.” Hispanic American Historical Review 84, no. 4 (2004): 
575–617. 
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destined to work in the mercury mine.90 Without the mita system, mines might not be profitable; 
the quinto tax on silver was cut into a diecimo for precisely this concern. If Huancavelica 
struggled to make a profit with the subsidized labor force, so the argument goes, imagine the cost 
if it had to pay a fair price.91 
Originally, in 1571, Toledo set the mita quota for Huancavelica at 900 workers. In 1577, 
the quota increased to 3,280, as the silver mines at Potosí needed more and more mercury. Even 
at its outset, mitayos were paid a wage, but it was below subsistence levels, and below what their 
free-wage counterparts (alquilas) earned. Ultimately, more alquilas were used than mitayos in 
Huancavelica in the eighteenth-century. Whether the shift to free-wage labor is because health 
conditions were better, or the mita was widely avoided, is unclear. 
Mercury Poisoning and Workers’ Health 
In addition to the ethical implications of the mita, which declined in use throughout the 
eighteenth century, there were also numerous hazards in mining mercury. Mercury, after all, is 
toxic. Mercury poisoning can occur in its water-soluble forms, by inhaling of mercury vapor or 
ingesting any mercury, which includes the toxic effects of water run-off. At the same time, even 
before Spanish conquest, Huancavelican mercury was consistently extracted for human use. 
Long before Pizarro or Toledo, Huancavelica’s mercury deposits were used by native 
Andeans. The llimpi or cinnabar, made of mercuric sulfide, was extracted and used in 
ceremonies, painting warriors’ bodies, or as cosmetic; cinnabar has an exceptionally potent red 
pigment. The Inca did not have a writing system.92 Thus, written records of pre-Hispanic 
 
90Ning Ma, The Age of Silver: The Rise of the Novel East and West. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 93. 
91 D.A. Brading, The First America: The Spanish Monarchy, Creole Patriots and the Liberal State 1492-1866. 
Cambridge University Press, 1991.  
92 Historians speculate on the knotted series of cords called a quipu— was it a system of accounting or language use? 





cinnabar processing are not available. Archaeological evidence shows, however, analyzed 
sediment cores from two lakes near Huancavelica. Mercury pollution can be dated back to 1400 
BC, the earliest mining evidence in the Andes. Colin Cooke, an environmental geologist at the 
University of Alberta, concluded that prior to Inca, mostly llimpi was used ceremoniously; in 
later years, the ore would be heated, and release toxic gaseous vapors, which are more hazardous 
to human health. The ovens were one of the most dangerous working sites, as the inhalation of 
mercury vapor is especially toxic. At the distillation ovens, the mercury was heated, and workers 
inhaled the noxious vapors.  When ingested, most mercury passes through the human body 
without being absorbed, and maybe a small part is penetrated through one’s skin. The Spanish 
system of mercury extraction had an entirely different level of danger for its workers than the 
prehispanic system. Even setting aside the ethical question of an obligatory mining workforce, 
the Spanish system led to an increase in mercury vapor, the element’s most toxic form. Mercury 
is an exceptionally toxic mineral. Symptoms of mercury poisoning include muscle weakness, 
rashes, difficulty speaking, hearing, seeing, numbness in the hands and feet, and difficulty 
balancing.  
Between 1564 and 1810, the colonial period, 17,000 metric tons of mercury vapor were 
emitted from cinnabar smelting in Huancavelica. Alone, two mines, Huancavelica and Potosí, 
contributed more than 25% of the 196,000 metric tons of vapor emissions in all of Latin 
America93. In the early 1600s, as many as two-thirds of Huancavelica’s laborers died. In modern 
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Huancavelica, the province has one of the country’s highest infant mortality rates. Over 80% of 
homes in Huancavelica are constructed with bricks contaminated with mercury.94  
Other Hazards of the Mine 
Mercury poisoning was only one of many hazards. Originally, the gremio only worked 
the surface ores, in an open pit; but as the years passed, the workers dug deeper. The sides of the 
pits would cave in, especially during the invernada or rainy season, and workers could be 
maimed or crushed to death. Water would often flood the pit, and miners would suffer in icy 
water, “frigid temperatures and high winds found at 13,000 feet above sea level.”95  The dry 
season offered no reprieve, as the sun beats down through the thin atmosphere. Pneumonia was 
common, and deadly. The subterranean tunnels were lit with candles and torches, and filled with 
what officials called umpé, or carbon monoxide, as smoke settled to the bottom of the tunnel.  
Arthur Whitaker described the health risks as “the evils of the mita at its worst”, 
consisting of mercury poisoning, carbon monoxide poisoning, pneumonia, and cave-ins; 
ultimately, “a horrific working environment.”96 Spanish administrators attempt to reform the 
mine on behalf of workers. Viceroy Luis de Velasco attempted to ban underground mining, 
where carbon monoxide poisoning was wont to occur. In 1604, after Velasco’s continuous 
pleading, miners were confined only to work on whatever ores were in the open pit, which, of 
course, had its own aforementioned health hazards of extreme temperatures and landslides. Yet, 
per Velasco’s reasoning, at least the miners would not suffocate to death. Velasco’s successor, 
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the Count of Monterrey, “studied the economic realities” and decreed underground mining to be 
necessary. One step forward, two steps back, a common theme in reforming Huancavelica. 
The Mita and Labor Conditions under Sola  
Jerónimo de Sola y Fuente wrote that the mita was “a labyrinth very difficult to escape”, 
a problem impossible to solve.97 He mused, as well, that “I wish it were not so notorious the 
inhumanity, in general in which they [mitayos] are treated.”98 Sola wished Spanish cruelty was 
not so infamous, rather than wishing working conditions were healthier. While perhaps that is 
nitpicking the language of a devoted Regalist, the point remains true the quotation seems most 
concerned with Spanish reputation. Regardless, Sola generally presents working conditions at 
Huancavelica as relatively successful. In particular, Sola discusses the difficulty of fulfilling the 
mita contract, the impossibility of switching to convict labor, and the gremio’s desire for the 
commutation fee at the expense of the long term health of the mine. In terms workers’ health, 
Sola’s major contribution was a new ventilation shaft, and the innovation to switch to blasting 
instead of pick and shove when extracting ore. However, I argue Sola paints too rosy a picture in 
his presentation of healthy working conditions; while Huancavelica was markedly improved 
from the 1600s, by no means was it safe. 
As previously discussed, rarely were the asientos followed. Of the 620 mitayos promised 
to Huancavelica, 446 actually arrived under the governorship of Casa Concha. For Sola, that 
number was even less, at 376 mitayos.99 Like previous scholarship supports, Sola noted that it 
 
97“es un labyrintho muy difícil de salir de él” 
Jerónimo de Sola, Relación e Informe, 83. 
98“ojalá, no fuera tan notoria la inhumanidad, con que por lo general los tartan” 
Jerónimo de Sola, Relación e Informe, 83. 
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was very difficult to have mitayos work in person, rather than mitayo en plata where corregidors 
would pay the fee.  
In Sola’s Relación, he wrote, “There is no talk of fears, which before they had to scourge, 
and lose their lives or health: I cannot deny, that before it was quite common, that a miner, in 
general, could not endure without shedding blood, or becoming ill from mercury, within three to 
four years at work; and now, they are seen entering the mines and leaving as robust and healthy 
at the end of their work, as they arrived on the first day.”100 In other words, workers leave as 
healthy on their last day as they enter on their first; mercury poisoning was a thing of the past. 
Arthur Whitaker refers to this specific quotation as evidence that Sola “had already called 
attention to the virtual disappearance of mercury poisoning in the Huancavelica mine.”101 I posit 
that while the mining conditions might have improved, this should not be taken to mean the 
“virtual disappearance.” According to Sola, other miners attribute the action of blasting in 
purifying the “males vapores de la Mina” (likely the quicksilver in dust, that a miner would often 
inhale when using a pick axe). In Sola’s opinion, improved conditions were due to the 
enlargement of the tunnels and improved ventilation. Thus, improved health might have more to 
do with carbon monoxide poisoning than of mercury poisoning. Regardless, the effects of 
mercury poisoning can cause health complications long after initial exposure, and even so, the 
mita had its own difficulties.  
 
100 “No se habla ya de los miedos, que antes tenían de azogarse, y perder la vida ó la salud: no siendo capaz de negar 
ningun desapasionado, era aquí dictamente corriente, no haver piquero por lo general, que aguantasse sin arrojar 
sangre, y azogarse, de tres a quatro años en el trabajo; y ahora se les vé entrar, y salir tan robsutos al fin de este 
tiempo, como el primer día.”  
Jerónimo de Sola, Relación e Informe, 37. 
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Sola wrote that the mita was rarely fulfilled, but whether “this fault falls to the relief of 
the miserable Indians, or of those who govern them in their Provinces”102, he would not 
speculate. The only certainty is that the mitayos were not arriving. However, Sola noted the 
necessity to have the mita in person, despite what the Gremio wanted: 
It is extremely necessary the mita comes as people, because the Indians are dedicated to 
repairing and cleaning the Mine, and the smelting of metals, in everything that the 
continuation of this practice has made them skillfully practical. Of the others, the Miners 
fancy better, the mita come in Silver, to help themselves by force of their diligence with 
other Alquilas; not because if they were achieved effectively, and fell in due conformity, 
it was no more appreciable; but what is recognized, is, that starts with the poor 
disposition of the Corregidores, that for the said reasons, or for other guilty causes they 
do not embed, to those who rigorously affects [the mitayos]; and for the most part, that 
the Indians take to leave their sad houses, they hardly stop travelling for usually two, or 
three days; and many in it, who take the first help, when they become; and although it is 
the obligation of the Provinces to reimburse them, this is an eternal account, which 
[even] if it is rarely liquidated, complete payment is never achieved. 
For which reason, although at the beginning I was somewhat influential, in that all had 
to come effectively, I did not produce another outcome, than to tire in vain, for not 
missing the matter more, than enough shelter to the Corregidores, capital enemies, not 
from Mita; but that this is precisely personal, having their well-known interests. And I 
think, it will be in vain any work, and it is not without risk to write this down.103 
Sola ultimately felt as though he were working in vain to gather the needed mita, because 
the corregidores had their own interest; however, the mita was necessary, because they knew 
how to repair and clean the mercury mine better than any others, in Sola’s view. However, the 
 
102 “si esta falta recae en alivio de los miserables Indios, o de los que los goviernan en sus Pueblos” 
Jerónimo de Sola, Relación e Informe, 85. 
103 En que son summamente necessarias las Mitas en personas, por estar dedicados sus Indios a los reparos, y limpia 
de la Mina, y la fundicion de los metales, en todo lo qual la continuancion los ha hecho diestramente practicos. De 
las demás, apetecen mejor los Mineros, vengan en Plata, para socorrerse a fuerza de su diligencia con otros Alquilas; 
no porque si se logran efectivamente, y bajaraon en la debida conformidad, no fuera mas apreciable; pero lo que se 
reconoze, es, que parte por la malo disposicion de los Corregidores, que por los dichos motivos, o por otras 
culpables causas no embían, a los que rigorosamente les toca; y parte, por lo ma, que llevan los Indios el dejar sus 
tristes Casas, apenas se detinen por lo general dos, ó tres dias; y muchos en el mismo, que cogen el primero socorro, 
quando se vuelven; y aunque es de la obligacion de las Provincias su reintegro, esta es una cuenta eterna, que si rar 
véz se liquida, nunca se logra la satisfacción completa. 
Por cuyo motivo, aunque al principio infiftí, en que todos habían de venir efectivamente, no faqué otro fruto, que el 
de conocer, era cansarse en valde, por no faltar en la materia el más, que suficiente abrigo a los Corregidores, 
enemigos capitales, no de la Mita; sino de que esta sea precisamente personal, teniendo ellos sus notoriamente 
sabidos intereses. Y assi creo, será en vano qualquiera trabajo, que en el assumpto se quiera impender por razones, 
que no sin algun riesgo le pueden trasladar al papel.  




gremio did not mind that the majority of the mita became essentially a cash payment from 
corregidors who paid to commute the workers’ sentence.  
Convict Labor as an Alternative 
 Not all Spanish mines used mitayos and free-laborers as their work force. The job was 
also done by prisoners, a system especially predominant in Almadén. Sola declared the switch 
impossible in Huancavelica. Prior to his governorship, Sola toured the Spanish mercury mine, 
and took recommendations from a successful governor of Almadén to better administer 
Huancavelica. Indeed, in 1734, the former governor of Almadén, José Cornejo y Ibarra, made a 
report with recommendations for Huancavelica, including eliminating the guild for a system of 
direct crown exploitation, and making the governorship entirely independent from the viceroy. 
Sola was the governor appointed immediately following this report, charged with its 
enforcement. Thus, the transition to convict labor was a natural progression to consider, as 
Huancavelica was constantly measured in comparison to Almadén. On this topic, Sola writes, 
“merecieren esta pena”— this deserves the effort:  
And that this work [of prison labor] would be executed at such a great cost, that even 
today, when we talk about this idea, many sighs are heard, from those who already spend 
plenty, but it is equally so, that never could such an idealistic be fulfilled, for to do it, and 
it is notorious, that although the Prison was built, it was written to the Provinces, so that 
their respective Judges imposed this penalty [of laboring in the mines], and some 
condemned misdoers came, not one prisoner, to spend their detention here for fifteen 
days, or plus one month, because the entire situation of this mine is different from that of 
Almaden.104 
 
104 Y que se executó esta obra a tanta costa, que aun hoy, quando se habla de este punto, se oyen bastantes suspiros, 
de los que ayudaron a su gasto, pero igualmente lo es, que nunca pudo tener efecto cumplido tan elevado 
pensamiento, por ser publico, y notorio, que aunque se edifico la Carzel, se escribió a las Provincias, para que sus 
respectivos Juezes impusiessen esta pena, y vinieron algunos Malhechores condenados, no huvo uno, que passasse 
su detencion aquí de quinze dias, ó á lo más un mes, por ser distinta toda la situacion de esta Mina de la del 
Almaden 





Whenever Sola mentions the idea, everyone around him sighs. Switching to convict labor 
is an exhausting, pointless, conversation. The transition would be far too expensive, and although 
a prison was built, and some judges sentenced convicts to labor in Huancavelica, the “entire 
situation of this Mine is different than that of Almadén.”105 Sola then lists many practicalities of 
why the convict labor system could never work, in part because the responsibility to prevent the 
prisoners’ escape would be thrusted onto “some unfortunate Indio Alcalde [indigenous laborers 
in a supervisory role, below the veedores and sobrestantes]”. Sola, poignantly, wrote that “they 
would either make fun of him, or agree with them, and help them escape.”106 He also writes that 
“not even the veedores could know everyone”107 Other laborers might help the prisoners escape, 
because they would be sympathetic to the prisoners. The Spanish veedores do not know 
everyone in the mine, to be able to recognize they are prisoners. The veedores cannot be trusted 
besides. Prison labor is too expensive to enforce. While a small parcel of evidence, the 
impossibility of convict labor reinforces that the mine still had horrible working conditions. Even 
convicted criminals might have mercy taken upon them. 
The Mita and Labor Conditions under Ulloa 
Some scholars have cited Antonio de Ulloa as irrefutable proof of the better status of the 
mine. Ulloa was a renowned critic of Spain’s treatment towards indigenous populations. In 
Noticias Secretas, the secret report Antonio de Ulloa and his fellow naval officer Jorge Juan 
wrote, he advocated to ban repartos, the forced sale of worthless goods at inflated prices to 
indigenous peoples. He also advocated paying mitayos the same market value as free workers, 
 
105“por ser distinta toda la situacion de esta Mina de la del Almaden” 
Jerónimo de Sola, Relación e Informe, 86. 
106 “que, o hazen bura de él, o se conviene con ellos, y los acompaña en la suga.” 
Jerónimo de Sola, Relación e Informe, 86. 
107 “que ni aun los veedores pueden conozer a todos.”  




but conceded “Everyone in Peru would rail against a measure of this type.”108 In fact, Ulloa was 
so outspoken in Noticias Secretas, future historians have debated whether he was simple a 
proponent of the Black Legend. Criticizing Spanish treatment of indigenous Americans was 
fashionable, as the Black Legend developed in part to defend Protestants’ colonialism by casting 
Catholics as uniquely evil.  
Because in part of Ulloa’s reputation as a sympathetic, Enlightened scientist, scholars 
argued his testimony was irrefutable proof that Huancavelica’s working conditions were no 
longer appalling. Arthur Whitaker wrote,  
By fully corroborating earlier testimony to the fact that mitayos no longer suffered the 
mercury poisoning and other injuries that had once made this mine a hell on earth for 
their race. Since his desire to ameliorate the lot of the Indians was well known at 
Madrid, his testimony on this point especially established it beyond a reasonable 
doubt.109  
 
 Both Sola and Ulloa are cited as proof by Whitaker the mita and the mine was no longer 
as deadly as it used to be. However, I would argue that Whitaker is overly apologetic, and that 
Sola and Ulloa have varying motivations, and understandings, of the working conditions. While 
both are trained scientists (Sola having experience at Almadén), neither can be called 
humanitarian.  
 It is fundamentally true that Ulloa described the mine as not nearly as dangerous or 
unhealthy as before, and claimed it deserved less “compassion”.110 Yet, Antonio de Ulloa was a 
white man living in the eighteenth century,111 and while a reformist and gifted scientists, I think 
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the historiography deserves an explicit reckoning of his relationship with race as nuanced, and 
problematic. Of course, Ulloa operated and existed within his own cultural context, but to merely 
take his word as emphatic proof of the improved conditions of the mine is reckless. Ulloa had his 
own views, which oscillate between a fierce defense of indigenous people’s humanity, and 
reiterating racist stereotypes about their character and work ethic. Ulloa’s Relación, as Whitaker 
himself notes, was written as a scourge against corruption of the gremio, during a period in 
which he was trying to resign. 
Ulloa wrote in his Relación, 
This [tunnel] had a varanda of poles that were very bad, which surrounded themselves 
and many misfortunes happened, happening that the Indians, sometimes careless and 
sometimes because of drunkenness, fell down, and making occasion in my time when a 
mule loaded with metals knocked off by him [on the side: Providence] I arranged for the 
masonry parapet to be done, which it has been done, and I ordered it to be paved, as it is, 
to avoid the much mud that was done in that little path, which also corresponds to the 
tunnels of the mine.112 
 
The pillars meant to support the tunnel were often very weak, and many indigenous 
workers would fall and injure themselves. Ulloa claims this was sometimes due to the 
carelessness of indigenous workers, or their drunkenness. Yet, Ulloa first stated the poles were 
weak; how, then, does he conclude the injuries lie with indigenous people’s carelessness or 
drunkenness. Ulloa also has described the mine as “like a sieve”113, as it was so prone to 
flooding, making it slippery, and dangerous. His characterizations of drunkenness and 
carelessness are questionable. Ulloa sometimes blames the safety conditions of the mine on 
 
112 Este brocal tenía una varanda de palos muy mala, que se rodeaban y sucedía bastantes desgracias, acontenciendo 
que los yndios, unas vezes por descuido y otras con la embriaguez, se despeñaban, y haviendo ocación en mi tiempo 
en que una mula cargada de metales se despeñase por él [al margen: Providencia] yo dispuse que se hiciese el pretil 
de mampostería, que oy tiene, y mandé que se empedrase, como está, para evitar el mucho lodo que se hacía en 
aquel tráncito, el qual corresponde también sobre los oquedades de la mina. 
Antonio de Ulloa, Relación de Gobierno, 38 
113 “La mina estaba como una criba”  




previous governors, or members of the guild who illicitly mine into the pillars for mercury. This 
might be true (and many scholars believe so), however, when discussing the deaths of Indians, it 
is their carelessness and drunkenness. Ulloa’s priority was always increasing mercury 
production, rather than protecting indigenous workers. His oscillation between racism and 
humanitarian rhetoric is proof of an inconsistent vision of los indios. In shockingly overt 
language from a figure once compared to Las Casas114, Ulloa condemns “the natural laziness, 
which reigns in such a race, it is not easy to have them work if they were not forced to do these 
services.”115 However, Kendall Brown also notes that alquilas (free-wage laborers) rather than 
mitayos comprised most of the labor force; the argument goes, if voluntary labor exists, then it 
surely must not be so bad. Yet, Ulloa does repeat racist tropes of indigenous Americans as lazy 
drunkards, careless, and the mita as a source of necessary discipline or tribute to a sort of 
parental Spain.  
However, indigenous miners’ the use of alcohol in Huancavelica might have had a 
surprising basis in human anatomy, rather than the racist reasons Ulloa posited. Kendall Brown 
noted poisoned workers or azogados “turned to alcoholic stimulates to give temporary relief to 
their physical depression and restlessness”, and they suffered “powerful tremors of their heads 
and limbs which made walking, eating, and drinking difficult.”116 Turning to alcohol as a self-
medication to treat one’s mercury poisoning might explain the drunkenness Ulloa saw. He went 
so far as to claim brandy killed more than twice as many workers as mercury poisoning; could it 
be the case they were one and the same, or at least related? I posit it warrants consideration. 
 
114Lewis Hanke, “Dos Palabras on Antonio de Ulloa and the Noticias Secretas.” The Hispanic American Historical 
Review 16, no. 4 (1936): 479–514. https://doi.org/10.2307/2506989. 
115 “assí la circunstancia de contribuirlos las provincias se reduce a tener gente segura, porque en la pereza natural, 
que reina en semejante gente, no cería fácil conceguirlos si no se les obligase a hacer estos servicios.” 
Antonio de Ulloa, Relación de Gobierno, 153. 
116 Brown, Kendall W. "Workers' Health and Colonial Mercury Mining at Huancavelica, Peru." The Americas 57, 




When mercury poisoning symptoms include difficulty walking, and the mine is flooded, 
carelessness might not be the cause of workers’ falling, nor their drinking habits.  
Antonio de Ulloa, though repeatedly deemed “honest”, had his own motivations. In 
Noticias Secretas, Ulloa described “the sulphourous smoke that they continually breathe, coming 
from the ovens in which they extract the mercury, which are in such abundance, that in summer 
time with the freezes, form a dense cloud, that covers the area of the town”117, citing mercury as 
one cause of childhood respiratory illness. Yet, as governor, he asserted that mercury poisoning 
was no longer a threat to workers.118 While Antonio de Ulloa and Jorge Juan y Santacilia 
travelled to the Spanish Indies in 1735-1744, their report was written in 1749; Ulloa became 
governor of Huancavelica in 1758. In my view, the confidentiality of the Noticias Secretas 
speaks in part to its honesty, while a relación has its own bias and motivation to self-report in a 
more flattering light, especially given the other problems of his administration. Glossing over 
working conditions might make sense, as the relación focused intently on the gremio and 
corruption. To point out the many dead and ill workers might not be in Ulloa’s best interest, as 
his report already contains many difficulties he experienced in his self-described purgatory. In 
reporting on one’s own tenure, to a superior officer, Ulloa’s honesty cannot be. The intellectual 
reckoning given to the Noticias’s reputability in the nineteenth and mid-twentieth century must 
also occur with his Relación; its honesty cannot be assumed. 
Drawing Meaning: the Mita and Health in Huancavelica 
 
117Nicholas Robins, Mercury, Mining, and Empire : The Human and Ecological Cost of Colonial Silver Mining in 
the Andes (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2011), 136 
118Nicholas A. Robins, and Nicole A. Hagan. “Mercury Production and Use in Colonial Andean Silver Production: 






 Both Sola and Ulloa were operating in a system where the mita existed, although to a 
lesser scale than the seventeenth century. Ultimately, the mita was an obligatory work program. 
While many indigenous peoples commuted their sentences, via the corregidores paying their 
commutation fee, or indigenous leaders appealing to reduce the quota required, the mita still 
existed. Neither advocated for the mita to end. Likewise, while Ulloa adamantly defends the 
safety of the mine, Sola felt that the gremio was largely obstructive towards any real labor 
changes, preferring the mita en plata as a quick cash flow. In examining Sola’s relationship to 
the gremio in the next chapter, Sola’s description of “merecieren esta pena”119, what is worth the 
effort and pain, is particularly apt. Sola framed labor in terms of economic output, describing the 
impossibility of prison labor, and the need for skilled laborers. Ultimately, both Sola and Ulloa 
should be looked to with more skepticism, regarding their descriptions of healthy and safe 
working conditions. Scholars consistently cite them as honest, upright, and Enlightened. It is 
worth remembering they were colonial officials in the eighteenth century, and what they claimed 








If there are monstrosities in the government of men, nowhere is worse than the miners of 
Huancavelica; if there is any punishment under the guise of an apparent title of honor, it is to 
govern this guild.120 
Chapter Four: Lima, The Gremio, and the Governors 
Introduction 
To govern Huancavelica was a tenuous balancing act: between conflicting and conflating 
interests from limeños (elites in Lima), the gremio, and the Crown. Especially in Antonio de 
Ulloa’s Relación, the dominant theme was a contentious battle between him and the gremio and 
the corruption embroiled in Huancavelican administration. Ultimately, while Jerónimo de Sola 
and Antonio de Ulloa had relatively comparable tenures as governors, in terms of increasing 
mercury production, their similar perspective on the mita and working conditions, the two 
governors varied dramatically in their interactions with the miners’ guild and audiencia in Lima. 
Jerónimo de Sola appeared much more inclined to acquiesce to the guild’s interest, while Ulloa 
was much more combative, despite Sola’s, at least nominally, greater administrative power.  
To structure this chapter, I introduce a brief guide to Spanish colonial administration, as 
well as historiographical discussion on creoles and peninsulares. I then discuss various aspects 
of the guild and its relationship to the governor, with continuing discussion on the varying levels 
of administrative power Sola and Ulloa had. In analyzing Jerónimo de Sola’s tenure, I discuss 
how the audiencia challenged his powers of the ramo de azogue, the role of his trusted deputy of 
the mine, Manuel Saldana, and how the gremio influenced Sola in lobbying for certain preferred 
labor practices. In discussing Ulloa’s administration, I focus especially on the legal battle he was 
ensnared in between two veedores and the Viceroy of Peru himself, Manuel de Amat y Junyent. I 
 
120Si ay mostruocidades en el govierno de los hombres, está verificado más que en ninguna otra sociedad en la de los 
mineros de Huancavelica; y si hai pena simulada que imponerle a un hombre baxo del título aparante de ocupación 
onorífica, lo es el governar este Gremio 





finish with some tentative conclusions about two different governorships: Sola might have been 
more willing to acquiesce, but he had more legitimate power in his post, whereas Ulloa was more 
combative, with less substantive backing. I conclude there are a variety of reasons Sola might 
have behaved as he did, in comparison to Ulloa, including the fact that he had more legitimate 
authority to fall back upon if necessary. Sola was also appointed after a wave of reforming 
governors, like the Marquis de Casa Concha. In contrast, Ulloa, lacked some of the powers Sola 
had, especially control of the ramo de azogue. Antonio de Ulloa also inherited the post from a 
notoriously corrupt administration and years of consistent depleting mercury outputs.  
A Guide to Colonial Administration  
To evaluate Sola and Ulloa’s relationship with the various sectors of colonial 
administration, we must first introduce the actors and institutions of administration: the monarch, 
the Consejo de Indias, the viceroys and viceroyalties, the audiencia, the alcaldes mayores or 
corregidores, and, of course, the gobernadores. I have listed these roles in roughly descending 
order of power. The monarch, of course, held the most power. The Council of the Indies, or 
Consejo de Indias, established in 1524, was an advisory committee to the King with 
administrative and legislative functions, on all matters in the Spanish Americas and Philippines. 
The viceroyalties were the larger provinces in Spanish America, and until the eighteenth century, 
included only New Spain (roughly, modern-day Mexico) and Peru (Spanish South America). In 
1739, the viceroyalty of New Granada was recognized, centered in Santa Fe de Bogota. The 
viceroys were essentially executive officers, with control of the colonial treasury. Various 
audiencias, for example in Lima and Quito, served as regional courts of appeals, with oidor or 
judges who also had some legislative power. The audiencias were key oversight institutions, 




oidores appointments were also lifelong posts, contributing significant power to the audiencia. 
At the local level, alcades mayores or corregidores governed over provinces. These individuals 
had strong, localized power, including the ability to collect the repartimiento, or the system of 
forced sale of goods at inflated prices to the indigenous population. In a similar vein, 
gobernadores or governors were essentially provincial executives, but particularly militaristic 
actors, if placed on the frontier.  
Origins of the Gremio 
After the expropriation of the mine in 1563, rather than have direct extraction by the 
Crown, the mercury mine was leased to gremio, who would operate and extract the mine on their 
own private accounts. In exchange, the gremio was contractually obliged to sell the extracted 
mercury back to the crown. Under this system, Spain was a sort of landlord, leasing out the use 
of the mine, while maintaining its ultimate ownership. Initially, Huancavelica’s miners’ guild 
was composed of the original six discoverers of the mine. In succeeding years, descendants were 
given priority as applicants for admission to the guild. In the eighteenth century, the guild grew 
to about thirty people. Because each miner had his own crew of workers, his own excavation, 
and his own furnaces to distill the mercury, the guild members demonstrated some 
socioeconomic diversities. Some members were wealthy, due to operating in areas with rich 
mercury veins, while others relied on a weak, seasonal, and inconsistent income.  
Corruption, Creoles and Peninsulares 
The historical conception of creoles and penisulares politics is relevant to the discussion 
on Sola and Ulloa. Creoles were Spaniards born in the Americas, while penisulares were 
Spaniards born in Spain; traditionally in the historiography of Spanish colonialism, the 




attributing various colonies’ independence from Spain as an inherently creole movement. In fact, 
Leon G. Campbell proclaimed “Jorge Juan and Antonio de Ulloa, for example, in 1741 described 
Lima as ‘a theatre of discord and perpetual wrangling’ between creoles and peninsulares, which 
surpassed in intensity the hostility between two nations at war. That this antipathy existed is 
irrefutable.”121 During the eighteenth century, peninsulares, and especially military officers, 
were viewed by the reforming Bourbon Crown as more effective administrators. Spanish 
peninsulares faced greater social and reputation costs from disloyalty to the Crown, and so the 
military and nobles were seen as closely entwined with the Crown’s interests, more loyal and 
morally upright.  
To call the enmity between creole and peninsular irrefutable is, in part, because the 
differing status of the two groups very much so existed. Yet, as both Campbell and Kendall 
Brown have successfully argued, whittling Spanish colonial history down to the paradigm of 
creole vs. peninsular is reductionist. For example, by the beginning of the eighteenth century, 
creoles held the majority of seats in the Audiencia in Lima.122 Yet, simultaneously, between 
1673 and 1751, office-selling was a common colonial practice. Selling colonial positions was a 
quick way to alleviate fiscal crises, especially during costly European wars (like the Seven Years 
War). In fact, during wartime, office posts sold for much higher prices, because extraction via 
illicit means from the provinces was an easier endeavor under the chaos of military conflict. The 
price of the post increased by 30% in wartime during peace.123  
 
 
121 Leon G. Campbell, "A Colonial Establishment: Creole Domination of the Audiencia of Lima during the Late 
Eighteenth Century." The Hispanic American Historical Review 52, no. 1 (1972): 1-25. Accessed January 27, 2020. 
doi:10.2307/2512140. 
122Ibid. 
123 Jenny Guardado “Office-selling, corruption, and long-term development in Peru.” The American Political 





Jerónimo de Sola’s Relationship with the Veedores and Gremio 
In contrast to Ulloa, Sola had a much less inflammatory relationship with the guild. Sola 
and Ulloa had somewhat strengthened administrative powers under the Bourbon Reforms— 
both, at least theoretically, could operate semi-autonomously outside of Lima and its audiencia. 
Ultimately, however, Sola had a less contentious relationship with the guild, at least in part 
because he had considerably more power. Sola’s nominal authority does not mean he was 
uncontested. He faced considerable animosity from the elite in Lima. With Sola’s appointment, 
the entirety of mercury funds transferred from the audiencia’s control. Yet, from the outset of the 
War of Jenkins’ Ear, “the viceroys insisted that all funds in Huancavelica surplus to the mine’s 
operating requirements be remitted to Lima; in this way, they frustrated the clause of Sola’s 
commission that ordered that all such surplus be sent directly to Spain.” Indeed, historian Pearce 
notes that “While these authorities [in Lima] always advanced sufficient funds to the 
Huancavelica treasury, they also found a variety of pretext to requisition sums from the income 
from mercury sales. This was in open violation of Sola’s authority, but the governor found it 
prudent to acquiesce to these affronts.”124 Rather than openly combat these charges, Sola simply 
sent the money as requested.  
The veedores or inspectors of the mine, while appointed by the governor, were paid by 
the gremio. As previously discussed, the miners had their own operating sites, with richer or 
poorer ores available. Naturally, this system incentivized bribing a veedor to look the other way 
as workers mine the rich estribos, critical to the foundation of the mine, but rich in ore. Sola 
noted the easily corrupted veedores in his Relación: “therefore I have had ample experience, that 
 






in this Places, very few are content with their assigned salary, even if it were raised.”125 
Regardless of their pay, few veedores felt it was sufficient. After all, in addition to their base 
salary, there were always miners willing to pay more for the veedores to look the other way as 
workers mined forbidden sites. Additionally, the gremio was the one charged with paying their 
salary, despite the fact the veedores reported to the governor, creating a deep conflict of interest. 
Rarely is it a good idea for accountability officers to be paid by those meant to be held 
accountable. Their salary was paid by the very members who would bribe them; nominal 
accountability to the governor meant little, even if the governor selected them. Sola writes of the 
fraud in a section titled It is not safe to trust blindly what the veedores report126:  
There is no doubt in saying, that if a Miner, or by Compadre del Veedor, or because the 
pillar is so profitable, it seems to him that the metal of a Estribo, or of the Pillar is the 
richest, and as such they feel like it, as it happens often, they will mine the estribo, and it 
is not difficult for the Veedor to excuse with some veil of legitimacy, to affirm the estribo 
was over there, that the metal was right to be mined, and cover it up with a repair of 
Lime, and stone is assembled artfully around them, so that the same strength seems to be 
maintained in the immediate vicinity.127 
 The veedor would lie, and cover up the mining of the estribos. This is not a novel 
occurrence, unique to the governorship of Jerónimo de Sola. The Huancavelica mercury mine 
had cave-ins in 1608, 1616, 1639, and 1640 due to the continuous, illicit mining the estribos. The 
problem was pervasive, and, in part, inherent due to the nature of the mining operation. The 
organization of the gremio charged different areas to be mined by different members, some 
 
125 “pues me hallo con sobrada expriencia, de que en este Paíz pocos se contentan con el salario assinado, aunque sea 
crecido” 
Jerónimo de Sola, Relación e Informe, 56.  
126 “No es tampoco lo mas seguro estar ciegamente a lo que informan los Veedores” 
Jerónimo de Sola, Relación e Informe, 44. 
127 No quedandome eserupulo alguno en assegurar, que sí a un Minero, ó por Compadre del Veedor, o porque se lo 
paga muy bien, se le antoja que el metal de un Estribo, o de un Puente es el mas rico, y como tal le apetece, pues 
sucede assi en la mayor parte, se le comerá, y no le faltará al Veedor escusa con visos de legitima, para afirmar 
estaba allí de más, que el metal se debe desfrutar, que con un reparo de Cal, y piedra queda igualmente assegurado, 
además, de que en los immediatos tiene el parage la misma fortaleza. 




richer or poorer. The pillars that supported the mine had the richest ore. The inspectors or 
veedores charged with preventing misconduct were paid by those they were meant to hold 
accountable.  
 In order to combat illicit mining, Sola appointed a trusted official, Don Manuel Saldana, 
after he fell too ill to inspect the mine himself. Manuel Saldana came with Sola from Spain, as he 
was the marquis of San Antonio. Sola sang his praises in his Relación: 
Having known him for many years, I am fully assured of his honesty, and of the love, 
with which he looked at everything, which seemed conducive to my good impression: he 
who would have dedicated himself to inspecting the Mine every week, the same practice 
I would do. And by this efficient means, the aforementioned; and I am glad with the news 
above, which gave me, we applied so much to effort to this substantial point, and punish 
the slightest contravention, which can be enshrined with reality, which everyone will say, 
be notorious, that no Miner, mayordomo , nor ayudante, as bold as they may be, it is hard 
for them to imagine touching, even slightly, any Stirrup, nor Pillar, because the Ministers 
of the Mine were not arbitrary or lax in permitting them to do so.128 
Sola was completely convinced of Manuel Saldana’s honesty and integrity, that no one 
would dare touch the estirbos, rich as they are with mercury. Sola’s trust in his deputy in the 
mine, Manuel Saldana, coupled with his acquisition to the audiencia’s challenge, might suggest 
Sola was an administrator willing to delegate or compromise his own authority. Perhaps it is not 
surprising his tenure lasted twelve years, longer than fourteen of the previous governors, as he 
was someone willing to compromise. Yet, Sola was also aware of how the issue of estribos 
would not go away after his administration ends.  
But I cannot fail to warn, that whenever they recognize a break in this surveillance, they 
[the miners] will not fail to lose all respect again, because of the incentive, always, their 
 
128Por haber mantenidose en mi compañia muchas años, tenía cumplida satisfación de su honradéz, y del amor, con 
que miraba todo, lo que suese conducente a mi buen ayre: el que haviendoíe dedicado a reconocer todas las semanas 
la Mina, se ha hecho tan practico de ella, como el que más. Y por este eficáz medio, el arriba; y yo abajo con las 
noticias, que me daba, nos aplicabamos tanto a zelar este tan substancial punto, y castigar la más minima 
contravencion, que se puede assegurar con la realidad, que dirán todos, ser notoria, que ya a ningun Minero, 
Mayordomo, ni Ayudante, por attrevidos que sean, les passa por la imaginacion tocar, ni aun levemente, en Estribo, 
ni Puente, por saber no tenían arbitrario en su permision los Ministros de la Mina.  






reigning greed. And this precise threat, the one who must be responsible, of what will 
happen, must be a trustworthy person worthy of such confidence, that by imposing 
himself, in what is happening in the mine, he can prevent with his attention and contain 
the disorder.129 
 
Sola claimed to have someone he can trust in his administration, a capable, honest delegate who 
could curb the illegal and dangerous practice of mining the estribos. However, he recognized the 
problem transcended his own administration; he must warn against the “disorder” that is bound 
to continue. The inertia of corruption is something Sola foresaw as an ongoing, inevitable issue, 
a looming threat against Huancavelica’s good governance. However, Ulloa cast some doubt cast 
on Sola’s representation of his faultless experience curtailing illegal mining. The relación as a 
final report evaluating one’s own governorship might have encouraged Sola’s embellishment of 
the trustworthy nature of his delegates, as it would reflect well on his own leadership. 
Antonio de Ulloa’s Relationship with the Veedores, the Gremio, and the Viceroy 
Sola’s premonition was correct. Ulloa’s veedores were not men like Manuel Saldana, 
who Sola knew for years from Spain. However, Ulloa even challenged the honesty of Sola’s 
veedores, writing, 
Jerónimo de Solo appointed two men no less rustic than those from Huancavelica, 
although they came from Almadén; the miners bribed them more than forty thousand 
pesos each; from such exorbitant sums it is understood how much disorder these 
contributions were meant to cover.130 
Ulloa estimated the miners bribed Sola’s veedores a total of 40,000 pesos, though how he 
arrived at that sum is unclear. To clarify, Saldana was not a veedor, but sort of Sola’s second in 
 
129Pero no puedo dejar de advertir, que siempre que se reconozca alguna intermision en otra igual vigilancia, con 
facilidad se les volverá a perder el respecto, por el incentivo, en todo ocacion, reynanre de la codicia. Y assi discurso 
preciso, el que háde ser responsable, de lo que sucedire, valerse de Persona de semejante confianza, paraque 
imponiendose, en lo que es la Mina, pueda con sus cierros avisos contener los desordenes.  
Jerónimo de Sola, Relación e Informe, 46. 
130D Gerónimo de Solo colocó en estos empleos dos hombres no menos rústicos de los de Guancavelica, aunque 
venidos de Almadén; los sobornos que los mineros les hacían les dieron más de quarenta mill pessos a cada uno; de 
tan exhorbitantes sumas se dexa comprehender quánto lo serían los desórdenes que eran motibo de estas 
contribuciones  




command, a position that did not exist in Ulloa’s governorship. Ulloa’s charges are against 
Sola’s veedores, but nevertheless paint a more complicated picture of Sola than the traditional 
“Restorador” de la mina.  
 While Sola less than modestly praised his own ability to curb corruption, Ulloa railed in 
his report against the indiscretion and corruption embroiled in the veedores especially. He wrote, 
“From the day the governor appoints the veedores, they have more authority and command in the 
mine than the governor himself, although they work underneath him...If there is ruin or 
landslides that occur, they are attributed to the governor’s misconduct…  the miners, and the 
entire Guild, the veedores, all conspire against him.”131 Ulloa then proceeds to call them evil. His 
strategy, ultimately, was an attempt at zero tolerance: he would bleach the forbidden estribo with 
lime, and claimed that anyone caught mining an estribo would be exiled. Yet, swift justice was a 
fiction in Huancavelica. Indeed, Ulloa himself constantly bemoaned the lack of accountability. 
Perhaps most relevant to Ulloa’s relationship to the gremio and audiencia in Lima was 
the contentious legal battle between Ulloa and his veedores, Joseph de Campusano and Juan de 
Afino, as well as the contractors Julian Pardo and Joseph Gordino. The governor chose the 
veedores and sobrestantes, the inspectors and contractors, but the guild paid their salaries. As 
Ulloa wrote in his relación, “each one [veedor] was paid thirty pesos in salary a week, or 1,560 
pesos a year, a very sufficient salary if they knew how to be content with what is legal and not 
aspire to the massive indiscretion and mischief they commit.”132 Yet mischief they did commit. 
 
131Desde el día en que el governador nombra veedores adquieren en la mina más authoridad y mando que el mismo 
governador, y le tienen debajo. Si las labores se reparten o se asignan con dictamen de ellos no son más que 
absurdos los que se cometen, y las ruinas o derrumbos que sobrevienen se atribuyen a mala conducta del 
governador, porque los mineros que las ocacionan, y quzi todo el Gremio, los sobrestantes, veedores y mayordomos, 
todos se conspiran contra él, si no las destina con parecer de estos hombres malignos.  
Antonio de Ulloa, Relación de Gobierno, 71-72. 
132 “Cada uno tiene treinta pesos de salario en la semana, que son el año 1,560 pesos, cosa mui competente si ellos 




The dominant theme of Ulloa’s Relación is ultimately a condemnation of the gremio and its 
entrenched corruption. 
Juan de Alasta, a prominent member of the gremio and its procurador or attorney, alerted 
Ulloa that the mine’s conditions were deteriorating. A veedor is charged with enforcing regular 
maintenance, thus ensuring workers safety and a productive mineral output, but the mine’s 
upkeep was so poorly maintained, some pits were entirely inaccessible. In response to what 
appeared to be neglect, Campusano and Afino claimed that forty maintenance workers were 
simply not sufficient to improve conditions; Ulloa approved hiring twenty more, and eventually 
there were 120 maintenance workers. However, the mine’s conditions did not improve, despite 
tripling the number of workers. Campusano and Afino were fired on charges of embezzlement. 
For more than a year, the veedor Joseph de Campusano paid Julian Pardo, the contractor 
(sobrestante) who supplied stone for more stone than was actually supplied. Pardo would then 
split the profit with Campusano. Pardo later testified that Juan de Afino, the other veedor, and 
Joseph Gordillo, the contractor who supplied candles for the mine, also knew about and 
consented to the arrangement. 
Both Kendall Brown and Arthur Whitaker noted that Ulloa had little legal training133; 
Ulloa convicted and punished Campusano, Afino, and Gordillo quite quickly. Brown notes that 
he gave the veedores’ defense team only three days to look over the papers and create a defense. 
In response, Gregorio Guido, a limeño, accused Ulloa of violating the accused’s procedural 
rights. From there, the battle only escalated. Ulloa was accused of the very thing he condemned 
the veedores and sobrestantes of: corruption. They accused Ulloa of removing a total of 
 
133Arthur P, Whitaker The Huancavelica Mercury Mine: a Contribution to the History of the Bourbon Renaissance 




seventeen estribos. The serious accusation launched a lengthy investigation in Lima, one that 
would last until Ulloa left his position as governor.134 
To complicate matters, the viceroy Manuel de Amat y Junyent has his own legacy of 
corruption, of which various historians have corroborated. Ulloa accused Amat of resenting him 
for not paying the customary bribe of 10,000-12,000 pesos to the viceroy.135 For scale, Ulloa’s 
salary as governor was 8,000 pesos. Historians have corroborated Ulloa’s allegation. At the end 
of Amat’s viceregal term, he had one of the largest lawsuits against him in the colonial archives. 
According to historian Alfonso Quiroz,  
Despite the customary acquittal of this type of trial, the contemporary documents by 
Amat solidifies the tremendous transgressions and abuses in which the viceroy was 
immersed during his government. Many of his subjects presented complaints and 
denunciations against Amat, which shows that Ulloa's criticism was clearly based on the 
reality of the administrative corruption inherited from the Habsburgs viceroyalty.136  
Quiroz compares the peninsular Amat to a Habsburg-era viceroy, notoriously corrupt. 
Yet, the peninsular Amat who apparently “despised the creole nobility”137, simultaneously also 
allied with them during the Seven Years War, because their financial aid was necessary to create 
a sufficient militia. 
Ulloa was ultimately exonerated by the viceroy and audiencia. On February 21, 1764, 
both veedores were found guilty, and permanently exiled from Huancavelica. However, as 
 
134 Brown, Kendall W. “The Curious Insanity of Juan de Alasta and Antonio de Ulloa’s Governorship of 
Huancavelica.” Colonial Latin American Review 13, no. 2 (December 1, 2004): 199–211. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/1060916042000301502. 
135 Arthur P, Whitaker The Huancavelica Mercury Mine: a Contribution to the History of the Bourbon Renaissance 
in the Spanish Empire, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1941). 
136A pesar del acostumbrado resultado absolutorio de dicho tipo de juicio, la residencia a Amat aclara las tremendas 
transgresiones y abusos en cuales se vio inmerso el virrey durante su gobierno. Muchos súbditos presentaran quejas 
y denuncias contra Amat, lo cual demuestra la críticas de Ulloa tenían claro sustenta en la realidad de la corurpción 
administrativa heredada del orden virreinal hasburgo. 
Alfonso W Quiroz, “Redes de Alta Corrupción En El Perú: Poder y Venalidad Desde El Virrey Amat a 
Montesinos.” Revista de Indias 66, no. 236 (January 4, 2006): 237–48, 241. 
137 Leon G. Campbell, "A Colonial Establishment: Creole Domination of the Audiencia of Lima during the Late 





historian Kendall Brown notes, “Even so, Amat wrote to Julián de Arriaga, the Minister of the 
Indies, that ‘the evil, in my opinion, and in that of everyone (including those most disposed 
toward the Governor) has sent out very deep roots.’”138 Amat went on to say that Ulloa ought to 
be replaced by someone less controversial. Ulloa, for his part, agree. He had offered to resign as 
early as May 1762. 
The conflict between Ulloa and the audiencia and viceroy in Lima must be situated in 
comparison to previous reforms, which aimed to make the Huancavelica governorship much 
more independent. Ulloa himself attributed many of his difficulties to a lack of administrative 
power, even directly comparing himself to the Marquis de Casa Concha and Jerónimo de Sola. 
He wrote in his Relación,  
Many years ago he realized, in the governance of Spain, and his Majesty came to the 
understanding that the imbalance of his Royal Treasury in Peru, and particularly in the 
field of mercury, was massive, in consequence, he provided in the employment of general 
superintendent of the branch of azogues to the Marques de Casa Concha, and at the same 
time, entrusting him with the superintendency of the el quinto royal of all the silver and 
gold in the mines of Peru, with total independence of the viceroys, and of all the courts 
and with amplitudes and privileges as they corresponded to the gravity of the coarse 
handling that was entrusted to him…139  
Ulloa described the creation of the Superintendency of Azogues, and the complete 
control over the ramo de azogues, the revenue produced by the mercury industry. Ulloa 
highlights considerable independence this entailed from the viceroy, but, because at the time of 
Casa Concha the appointments were from a rotational 3 year terms by oidores, Ulloa criticized 
 
138 Kendall W. Brown, “The Curious Insanity of Juan de Alasta and Antonio de Ulloa’s Governorship of 
Huancavelica.” Colonial Latin American Review 13, no. 2 (December 1, 2004): 199–211. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/1060916042000301502. 
139 Muchos años hace que se Sintió, en el Ministerio de España, y llegó a la intelixencia de su Majestad, el desbarato 
con que se majeaba su Real Hacienda en el Perú, y particularmente en el ramo de azoguez, en su concequencia se 
proveyó en el empleo de superintendente general del ramo de azogues al Marques de Casa Concha, encargeandole, 
al mismo tiempo, la superintendencia de los reales quintos de toda la plata y del oro que se beneficiarse en las minas 
del Perú, con total innivición de los virreyes, y de todos los tribunales y con unas amplitudes y privilegios como 
correspondían a la gravedad del manejo basto que se le encargaba; 




the lack of accountability these short terms had. Power only grew with the appointment of 
Jerónimo de Sola y Fuente. 
Jerónimo de Sola [was later appointed], with the same powers, powers, and prerogatives 
that had been granted to the Marquis of Casa Concha by the certificates of December 6, 
1719 and February 13, 1722, and some more; but the viceroys who could not bear a 
government in the Indies that was not dependent on their faculties, nor a ministry that is 
not subordinate to them, reverted back to the way that the old method operated, and the 
king did not rule the Count of Superunda and Huancavelica, the same gift Jerónimo 
represented the one who pretended to have absolute power, who on such an urgent 
occasion as those of the wars he then had with England, by the year of [17]45, they 
denied him the monetary flows he had requested, lacking the obedience to the requests he 
had made for its release; and this was the reason why the General Superintendency was 
ordered to be in the viceroys, thus endeavoring to fall back into the disorder that they had 
tried to avoid.140 
 Ulloa’s excerpts reveal his understanding of his own political power as paled in 
comparison to Jerónimo de Sola, and Casa Concha. In 1722, Sola was given the power to 
requisition funds required by the mine from any treasury in the viceroyalty. Yet, as Ulloa 
described, Sola was denied funds he requested, and succumbed. Ulloa in part blames Sola for the 
subsequent rolling back of the governorship’s authority. The court case dealt with more than just 
the corruption in the veedores, but also the corruption in Lima. The role of the governor’s 
authority was at stake, and whether the position should have direct executive control of the 
financial lines necessary to keep mercury production afloat honestly and without embezzlement. 
Instead, Ulloa had hired three times the number of the previous maintenance workers, only for 
the estribos to still be whittled away, compromising the structural integrity of the mine. 
 
140 Gerónimo de Sola, con las mimsas facultades inniviciones y prerrogativas que se le havían concedido al Marqués 
de Casa Concha por las cédulas de 6 de diciembre de 1719 y 13 de febero de 1722, y algunas más; pero lso virreyes 
que no pueden sobrellevar que aiga ramo en Yndias que no se diga ser dependiente de sus facultades, ni ministerio 
que no les esté subordinado, adbitrió el modo de que se bolviese a establecer el méthodo antiguo, y governando el 
reyno el Conde de Superunda y Guancavelica el mismo don GErónimo representó aquél que pretendía ser absoluto 
este otro, que en una ocación tan urjente como las de las guerras que entonce havía con la Ynglaterra, por los años 
de 45, le negaba los caudales que tenía atesorados, faltándole el obedecimento de las inthimaciones que le havía 
hecho para que se los franquease;  y esto fue causa de que se mandase que la Superintendencia General estubiese en 
lso virreyes, bolviéndo, por esto medio, a caer en el incobeniente que se havía procurado evitar. 




The facts of the case warrant a re-evaluation . Ulloa consented to the veedores’ request 
for more workers. His choice was despite the extensive amount of debt the gremio was in, but 
reasonably a good faith effort to maintain the mine, a priority Ulloa consistently refers to in his 
Relación. Upon discovering the embezzlement, his lack of procedural legal knowledge 
expediated procedural processes that did violate the norms Huancavelica’s judiciary system. Yet, 
he was ultimately exonerated. Characterizing Ulloa as entirely antagonistic towards the gremio 
ignores much context of the various attempts he made on behalf of the miners’ interests, as well 
as the authority of his position as fundamentally different than that of Sola.  
Drawing Meaning: Administrative Restraints and Frustration 
I would argue much of the historical fixation on Ulloa, that some scholars contend is 
unhelpful or misplaced, is understandable when reading his Relación, in his own words, 
describing his experience. Ulloa’s passion and “reformist zeal” might be best understood by 
looking to his own dramatic, impassioned account. 
To describe all of the frauds in Lima and Huancavelica is to report on how they denied 
credulity to everything that was truthful, and put the highest faith in what the inmates said 
from their prison, I would need to write a report completely separate from this report, but 
I will say, nevertheless, to serve as a guide to the successor of my post and advise how 
matters should be handled in the future, that the original crime was never punished in 
Lima against the inmates, because the prosecutor, the oidores and the dependents of the 
Palace were protected, and removed the proceedings entirely from the trial, horrible 
slander against me so excessive was encouraged that there was no part where my honor 
was not hurt, because they were outraged at not finding a loophole on the administration 
of mine and others of the government where to vent their revenge, they used those means, 
vile that people snub me for the corrupting the traditions and customs, attributing to me 
that insults that even among the most despicable and abandoned people could not listen to 
without being shocked; in short, the ruins of the mine mentioned above, committed by the 
miner Gómez, by Cañas and by Campusano are attributed to me; the ore estribos 
destroyed by them, in the same way; the tunnels and ruined streets, the plazas and 
intractable work, the same; and the inmates were looked upon with compassion, 
recording in the fiscal hearings and in the records that they were suffering innocently 
because they remained in prison, so that in the entire course of the case, neither the 
prosecutor nor the Agreement, Nor did the viceroy try the inmates more than to excuse 




to attribute it to me because I corrected him and tried to punish himself, nor the cause if it 
was not to fill her with confusion and How many liberties they wanted to utter against me 
without any limitation.141 
He goes on for a time like this, enraged at his treatment. At one point, Ulloa accuses the 
veedores of buying influence in the audiencia. Ultimately, the ending of the trial is a mixed 
story. Was Ulloa exonerated? Sort of. Yet, the court battles also reveal that political tensions in 
Huancavelica were not along creole and peninsular lines.  
Ultimately, there is no clear story. The history does not map neatly onto peninsular and 
creole lines, and many of the issues Sola faced, Ulloa also had to contend with. While Sola and 
his most trusted deputies were peninsulares, Ulloa had contentious relationship with the viceroy 
Amat, who was also born in Spain. Sola likewise had corrupt veedores, who Ulloa accused of 
accepting tens of thousands of pesos in bribes. Ulloa, despite lowering the quinto real, as 
discussed in the previous chapter, still had enemies and friends within the guild. Both Sola and 
Ulloa directly noted that the possibility to make so much money as a veedor render the salary 
irrelevant. Yet, Ulloa’s Relación is three times the length of Sola’s, and far more dramatic. 
Historians’ fascination with Ulloa might be because of his Relación’s length and spirited writing. 
 
141 Hacer relación de los embrollos que en Lima y en Guancavelica se fraguaron para negar la credulidad a todo lo 
que se iba justificando, y poner en el más alto aprecio quanto los reos deponían desde su prición, necesitaba una 
obra ceparada y no es de este lugar, pero diré, no obstante, para que sirva de luz al succesor y vea el tiempo con que 
se debe manejar, que la causa nunca se siguió en Lima contra los reos, siendo el fiscal, los oydores y los 
dependientes del Palacio los protectores de ellos, y para apartarla enteramente del juicio, se fomentaron calumnias 
atrosez contra mí tan desmedidas que no hubo parte por donde no se tirase a lastimar mi honor, porque indignado el 
odio de no hallar resquicio sobre los asumptos de mina y demás del govierno por donde desaogar su vengansa, se 
valía de aquellos medios [tachado: libres] viles que desairan las personas por la corrupción de constumbres, 
atribuyéndome las que entre las jentes más despreciable y abandonada no se puede oyr sin escandecerse; en fin, las 
ruinas de la mina de que queda hecha mención, ocacionada por el minero Gómez, por Cañas y por Campusano se 
me atribuyan a mí; los estrivos del mineral destruidos por éstos, del mismo modo; las calles ciegas y arruinadas, las 
plasas y labores intratables, igualmente; y a los reos se les miraba con compación, diciéndose en las vista fiscales y 
en los autos de Acuerdo que los hacía padecer inocentemente porque los mantenía en prición, de suerte que en todo 
el curzo de la causa, ni el fiscal, ni el Acuerdo, ni el virrey trataron de los reos más que para disculparlos y sacarlos 
salvos del delito, para cepararlo de los que lo havían cometido y atribuírmelo a mí porque lo corregí y intenté que se 
castigarse, ni de la causa si no fue para llenarla de confución y de quantas libertades se les antojaban a aquéllos 
proferir contra mí sin ninguna limitación. 




I would conclude that Ulloa, as a figure, is much more openly combative and exceptionally well-
documented. Both have instances in which their reputability is not unquestionable, and should be 
looked too with a middling gaze: the honesty of Sola’s veedores, for example, and Ulloa’s swift 
departure without completing the necessary bureaucratic steps. In curtailing corruption during 
the Bourbon Reforms, often the narrative of honest, loyal peninsulares and greedy, corrupt 
creoles. Sola and Ulloa both prove a narrative that is more complicated than that, as two figures 





Chapter Five: Measuring Reform in Two Governors 
What comes next? 
 Jerónimo de Sola y Fuente left for Spain, in 1749, to his position on the Consejo de 
Indias. In 1763, he was appointed to the Cámara de Indias, the supreme body within the 
Consejo. Sola retained the post until his death, four years later, at 76 years old. Today, he has an 
avenue named after him in Madrid.  
 Antonio de Ulloa called Huancavelica his personal “purgatory”, in a letter to Julián de 
Arriaga, Minister of the Indies. He escaped his torturous post in January of 1764, only to be 
appointed to the first governorship of Louisiana, recently ceded from French to Spanish control 
in the Seven Years’ War. After begging the Crown to send reinforcements to consolidate Spanish 
control, he was ousted in a Creole uprising. His successor, Alejandro O’Reilly, and his troops, 
quelled the rebellion in 1769. In 1779, he was appointed lieutenant governor of the naval forces. 
On year later, Antonio de Ulloa commanded a Spanish squadron in the American War of 
Independence. He died, in 1795, in Cadiz, in retirement at the age of 79. A statue made of marble 






Fig. 5 Statue of Antonio de Ulloa in Madrid 1899 
  
 
142José Alcoverro, Statue of Antonio de Ulloa, marble, 1899, Madrid. In Wikimedia Commons. Photograph by Luis 





Some Symbolism: The Sea and The Spanish-American War 
Antonio de Ulloa was a renowned naval scientist and loyal devoted royal subject his 
whole life; perhaps it is unsurprising a ship was named after him, nearly one hundred years after 
his death. On May 1, 1898, the naval ship Don Antonio de Ulloa sunk outside of Manila, one 
month after the beginning of the Spanish American war. The Treaty of Paris, signed December 
10, 1898, conceded Spain’s last remaining overseas colonies— Cuba, Puerto Rico, the 
Philippines, Guam. The war’s end is often heralded as a watershed historical moment, signaling 
the United States rising role as a world superpower, and perhaps the most brutal and humiliating 
demonstration of Spain as an empire thoroughly in decline. An Atlantic article published mere 
months after Don Antonio de Ulloa sank wrote, without a hint of irony,  “In many respects the 
Spaniard is still living in the sixteenth century, unable to assimilate the ideas of the nineteenth, or 
to realize that his country is no longer the mistress of the sea and the dominating power of the 
land.”143 
The rise and fall of the Spanish empire is one almost inextricably laced with ideas of 
“decadence”, “pride”, and “indolence.” Spanish excess caused Spanish defeat, a natural product 
of moral failing. The Don Antonio de Ulloa, the naval ship named after the famed Enlightened 
reformer, sank in 1898; soon along with her, the Spanish colonies of Cuba, Guam, Puerto Rico 
and the Philippines. 
History has its tropes. Spanish (and more broadly, Catholic) greed and incompetence is 
one. Like most tropes, such evaluations do not hold up under closer scrutiny. Internal reformist 
movements in the eighteenth century, in the decades before the vast majority of Spanish 
 






American revolution and independence movements, do not match this stereotypical and 
reductionist version of Spanish imperial history; rather, their principal aim was to decrease 
Spanish decadence and increase the Crown’s authority over its overseas colonies. 
Yet, in evaluating the governorships of Jerónimo de Sola y Fuente and the more famous 
Antonio de Ulloa, their resounding efficacy was not a primary finding. Rather, in good faith and 
based off their own ideologies and other scholars’ evaluations, two “honest” “upright” and 
“moral” men were unable or unwilling to stop the mita, to curb corruption of corregidores, the 
gremio, or wrangle more authority the Viceroy and audiencia in Lima. And, when Voltaire once 
called Ulloa an “"object of veneration", and a philosophe of the Enlightenment, Ulloa still 
endorsed and justified the forced indigenous labor system, with one biographer calling Ulloa the 
mita’s most “vehement” defender.144  
Despite the ten year space between their governorships, Sola and Ulloa faced similar 
issues. Both were charged with one preeminent goal: increasing mercury production. Both had 
complicated relationships with the mita and indigenous workers. Both grappled with corruption, 
although in different ways. 
Jerónimo de Sola y Fuente was charged by the King to produce 5,000 quintals of 
mercury, and he did so. Antonio de Ulloa’s tenure also significantly increased the total 
production of mercury from Huancavelica. Both governors likely had labor conditions that were 
improved from the sixteenth century, although the system remained inhumane by any modern 
measurement. Even at the time, both governors defended the mita as necessary and morally 
upright, despite contemporary criticisms and attempts to stop the practice. In negotiating power 
from relevant stakeholders, Jerónimo de Sola y Fuente likely had more political capital, due to 
 




his status as the first governor directly appointed by the King, and his license to control all of the 
ramo de azogue. In contrast, Ulloa came on the heels of Gaspar de Cerda y Leyba and Pablo de 
Vega, the former a governor notoriously ill and physically weak, and the latter a man who 
unabashedly sold bootleg mercury in the town plaza. Ulloa also lacked some of the substantive 
powers Sola had enshrined in writing. Their different political style, with Ulloa being more 
combative, could be partly attribute to personality, or also due to the relevant authorities the 
King vested in them. With less de jure authority vested in Ulloa, perhaps he attempted de facto 
authority. He would not be the first governor to do so; his Minería del Rey, for example, was also 
attempted by Gaspar de Cerda y Leyba. In contrast, Sola apparently acquiesced more to the 
gremio and audiencia in Lima, as evidenced by sending the stores to Lima when he was entitled 
by law to send them to Spain. Yet, perhaps because he had this authority, Sola reasoned that 
should he ever need to invoke those powers, he could. Ulloa did not have that same luxury. I also 
argued Ulloa’s characterization as combative may be reflective of the drama of his well-recorded 
conflicts, and ignores the various efforts he made in cooperation with the gremio: eliminating the 
quinto, increasing aid, and hiring more maintenance workers, for example. 
Implication of Findings 
Evaluating these two governorships in terms of economic administration and production, 
management and reform of the indigenous labor system, and their relevant scandals and power 
dynamics between the various stakeholders in the Viceroyalty in Peru, is a worthwhile endeavor. 
Internal reformist movements such as the Bourbon Reforms should be studied in part through the 
lens of the microhistorian, who focuses on specific individuals and particular events. The 
Bourbon Reforms are a broad topic, generally cast in the lens of top-down attempts to regain 




preserve power in the Americas already well on their way to independence. This generalized 
interpretation holds some value, as does the framework of peninsular vs creole interests. Macro 
studies of the long eighteenth century allow for such larger conclusions. Simultaneously, 
studying individual actors, and speculating and reaching conclusions on their limitations, their 
reasoning, and their substantive outcomes in realigning particular provinces allows specificity. 
Looking at historical agents humanizes historical movements, and creates a history of living 
people, making choices, and grappling with their own circumstances.  
Summary of Findings 
How does one reform an Empire? At least in part, through administrators. How does one 
measure efficacy in administrators? I find that success is a mostly useless term, and instead chose 
to look at the governors’ goals, substantive outcomes such as production levels, previous actors’ 
abilities in pursuing similar goals, and speculating on the limitations of their power and the 
reasoning behind their choices. I came to tentative conclusion that both Jerónimo de Sola y 
Fuente and Antonio de Ulloa had marked similarities in producing more mercury, their views on 
the role of indigenous labor in the mind, and frustrations with the gremio and Lima more 
broadly. My small contribution adds to a conversation fascinated with Antonio de Ulloa, in 
which Jerónimo de Sola often appears only as a footnote or point of comparison of “success.” 
The reason one governor is labeled a success, and the other a failure, seems to be, at least in part, 
because of Ulloa’s legal battles and perhaps even colored by his later governorship in Louisiana. 
Ulloa, in contrast to Jerónimo de Sola y Fuente, left an impressive cache of documents detailing 
his disputes with various veedores, the Viceroy Amat, and indeed his experience in Quito as a 
young man on a scientific expedition. His reputation as an inflamed and controversial man is 




(and instigated). Yet, this alone should not color historians’ entirely from noting the positive 
aspects of his tenure. Perhaps his combative nature extends naturally out of frustration with 
stilted power compared to previous governors such as Jerónimo de Sola y Fuente. 
Discussion of Evidence 
The primary sources used in this thesis were the Relaciónes of both governors. Secondary 
sources included prominent scholars on the Bourbon Reforms and experts in the mining industry 
in the Spanish Americas. Necessarily, primary sources contain their own biases, and I have 
explicitly discussed and questioned why each governor would write as they did about their 
tenure. I believe these self-reports to be useful starting points to discuss governors’ motivations 
and goals, because their own words offers insight to their own motivations and visions of their 
tenure as reformers in Huancavelica. Necessarily, however, the evidence is problematic and 
limited. I did not evaluate other primary documents, such as Ulloa’s letters to Julían Arriaga, 
minister of the Indies, for example, or Sola’s letters to King Ferdinand VI, in no small part 
because I lacked access to those documents. Indeed, in most historical studies on Sola, the 
sources used include his Relación and viceregal reports, but little personal letters. Future studies 
should use more documentary texts, as well as investigate Sola’s presence or lack thereof in 
archival records. 
Future Points of Interest 
Here I outline some possible points of further research in the hopes a dedicated scholar 
rises to the challenge. Many historians have noted the gap of interest in the Bourbon Reforms, 
where most studies have focused on later efforts after the ascension of Charles III. Significant 
strides have already lessened this discrepancy. I, however, would ask about women in 




true in Huancavelica. A New York Times article published in 2019 showcased the startling 
statistic that .5% of recorded history is devoted to women’s study, according to classical 
historian Dr. Bettany Hughes. Antonio de Ulloa’s wife, Francisca Ramírez de Laredo, was 15 
years old at the time he was forty-eight, and most biographers ignore her, or mention her only as 
they are escaping Louisiana during the Creole Uprising that ended his governorship. Some 
speculate on her wealth, briefly, and mention her father as the conde of San Javier. In addition, 
even less research has been done on nonelite women. This is due to the scarcity of written 
sources, which precluded me from the topic as well. However, there has been some success in 
metallurgical, oral, and archeological histories. A study of women miners, who are alluded to by 
Sola, would benefit the field. In addition, histories outside the mine and its administration would 
benefit students interested in colonial Huancavelica, especially in regard to village life. Much of 
Antonio de Ulloa’s relación discussed at some length both prostitution and extramarital affairs, 
for example. The public health field might benefit from a study concerning the hospital in 
colonial Huancavelica, St. John of God, and its doctors and patients. I would posit at least some 
written sources can be found surrounding the mita in hospital records, as well.  
Final Remarks 
 For the nearly three centuries of Spanish rule in the Americas, starting in earnest in the 
1540s in New Spain, silver, gold, and mercury was laboriously mined and set on carts or mules 
or llamas,  and set onto royal galleons or the pockets of smugglers. A town that never exceeded 
10,000 people in the colonial period was the jewel of the Crown, one that equaled Potosí in 
importance. With pick axes and shovels, or gunpowder, inside toxic tunnels filled with carbon 
monoxide, or outside in open pits in the freezing air, miners in colonial Huancavelica produced 




In my study, I have endeavored to cast doubt on the failures, successes, and intentions of 
two reforming governors of the only significant mercury mine in the Americas, during a 
particularly turbulent transitional period in the Spanish empire. I have based this study in the 
firm belief that colonial administrators warrant study as individual actors, and by focusing 
attention squarely on one person, a student can learn the contradictions and restrictions of 
reforming an empire. I believe it is too easy to think of an empire as swarths of land and sums of 
economic production, and too easy to forget the men and women that exist— whether with 
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